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Courts and agencies interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA) generally assume that workplace accommodations benefit individual 
employees with disabilities and impose costs on employers and, at times, cowork-
ers.  This belief reflects a failure to recognize a key feature of ADA accommoda-
tions:  their benefits to third parties.  Numerous accommodations—from ramps 
to ergonomic furniture to telecommuting initiatives—can create benefits for co-
workers, both disabled and nondisabled, as well as for the growing group of 
employees with impairments that are not limiting enough to constitute disabili-
ties under the ADA.  Much attention has been paid to how the integration of 
diverse groups of people helps to ameliorate discriminatory attitudes through 
“contact.”  But integrating people with disabilities also means integrating ac-
commodations.  These accommodations affect and benefit third parties in the 
workplace and thus shape attitudes toward both disability and the ADA.  An 
understanding of third-party benefits is crucial to designing and disclosing ac-
commodations in ways that will best promote the aims of the statute and the 
prospects of disabled people. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following scenario: 
At an academic conference, a speaker puts up a diagram on an overhead 
projector.  The image that appears on the screen is exceedingly compli-
cated—with arrows and circles and tiny print—and the audience mem-
bers squint at it, trying to make some sense of what they see.  After a 
moment, a man in the front row raises his hand, and, apparently re-
questing an accommodation for his vision impairment, asks the speaker 
to “please describe the diagram.”  The rest of the audience sighs in relief 
at the prospect of having this inscrutable diagram glossed by its creator. 
This moment captures an oft-overlooked feature of disability accom-
modations:  the simple request for an accommodation by a disabled 
person often benefits other people.  The accommodation of describ-
ing the diagram, provided because only one disabled person needs it 
and requests it, redounds to the benefit of others, both disabled and 
nondisabled. 
This academic scenario points us toward more conventional 
workplace examples of accommodations that have benefits for third 
parties.  An elevator or a ramp can be used by many people, particu-
larly those on wheels or toting objects on wheels.  Ergonomic furni-
ture reduces strain for employees generally.  An air-filtering system for 
an employee with asthma can improve air quality for everyone. 
Design matters.  An employee whose disability requires her to 
work from home for periods of time could be accommodated by peri-
odically reassigning her tasks to a coworker, creating added burdens 
for the coworker.  Or, alternatively, her accommodation request could 
lead her employer to create a broad-based telecommuting initiative 
that benefits multiple employees who wish to work from home.  Like-
wise, an employee whose psychiatric impairment leads him to request 
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more concrete work assignments and more measured and construc-
tive feedback could consume more of a supervisor’s time, to the det-
riment of other workers.  Or the process of designing this employee’s 
accommodation could lead an employer to rethink and improve its 
supervisory practices more generally.  These few examples gesture to-
ward the many ways that accommodations can benefit third parties. 
Yet courts and administrative agencies charged with overseeing the 
implementation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) have 
failed even to see these third-party benefits, much less to take them into 
account.  Key decisions about which accommodations are required by 
law have defined the crucial concepts of “reasonableness” and “undue 
hardship” in terms of costs and benefits, yet they have neglected the 
possibility of third-party benefits, even when recognizing third-party 
costs.  The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 
in providing formal guidance to employers trying to understand and 
comply with the ADA’s accommodation requirement, has discussed 
costs to third parties without making mention of benefits to third par-
ties.  Moreover, neither courts nor the EEOC has recognized the sig-
nificance for third parties of how accommodations are designed. 
This oversight obscures a crucial feature of integration—of con-
tact—under the ADA.  Much scholarly attention has been paid to the 
interpersonal effects of integrating diverse groups of individuals 
through “contact.”  Though the potency of contact is sometimes over-
played, contact studies do show that working together, side-by-side, on 
cooperative rather than competitive tasks, can alter attitudes and 
stereotypes.  Contact studies have focused principally on race, but the 
few studies that have looked at the integration of disabled persons 
into the workplace have found similar benefits.  These discussions of 
contact have overlooked its unique feature under the ADA:  integrat-
ing people with disabilities also means integrating accommodations.  
Those accommodations interact with other people in the workplace in 
varied ways, yet little attention has been paid to such interactions.  
And to the extent that accommodations have been understood to have 
effects on third parties, those effects have typically been seen as costs. 
Yet accommodations, while rightly designed to benefit people with 
disabilities, have more benefits and more kinds of benefits for others 
than are typically recognized.  Accommodations may benefit not only 
other disabled workers, but nondisabled coworkers, as well as the ever-
growing group of the sub-ADA disabled—that is, those individuals who 
have impairments that are not substantially limiting enough to qualify 
EMENS_FINAL_REVISED II.DOC 4/7/2008  10:51:56 AM 
2008] INTEGRATING ACCOMMODATION 843 
 
them for protection under the ADA.1  One aim of this Article is to rec-
tify this oversight by identifying third-party benefits across a range of 
accommodations and discussing ways that design and disclosure of ac-
commodations affect the extent of their benefits to third parties. 
Accommodations can, of course, impose costs on third parties, as 
well as conferring benefits on them, as the anecdote about the con-
ference presentation suggests.  The request for a description of the 
diagram helped audience members understand the diagram, but it 
may also have burdened some audience members who already under-
stood the diagram (if any did) or who simply wanted the talk to move 
along more quickly (as some surely did).  As an empirical matter, it is 
difficult to know whether the overall benefits of the accommodation 
outweigh the costs.  This Article therefore remains agnostic on the 
question of whether particular accommodations, or even accommoda-
tions in general, are ultimately more beneficial—to people with dis-
abilities or to the overall society—than they are costly.  The findings of 
the ADA embrace multiple goals, including broad integrationist aims 
as well as efficiency aims, and courts have made clear that the benefits 
of accommodations need not exceed the costs.2  Thus, the ADA does 
not require accommodations to be cost justified, for the employer or 
for society.  Nonetheless, courts have relied on the language of costs 
and benefits when interpreting the ADA’s accommodation require-
ment, and this Article therefore uses that language to identify a broad 
swath of considerations that have been previously overlooked in the 
analysis of accommodations. 
The inattention to third-party benefits means they have been un-
dertheorized.  This Article thus provides a series of analytic tools to 
help scholars, policymakers, and employers recognize these benefits 
and analyze accommodations with such benefits in mind.  It distin-
guishes between benefits that promote the general welfare and those 
that promote favorable attitudes toward disability and the ADA, em-
phasizing how the design and disclosure of accommodations can par-
ticularly help to promote the latter type.  This analytical clarification 
1 Cheryl Anderson has called this group the “‘not impaired enough’ plaintiffs.”  
Cheryl L. Anderson, “Deserving Disabilities”:  Why the Definition of Disability Under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act Should Be Revised To Eliminate the Substantial Limitation Re-
quirement, 65 MO. L. REV. 83, 85 (2000). 
2 See infra Part II.A (discussing the courts’ interpretation of the reasonableness re-
quirement and undue hardship defense as not requiring that benefits exceed costs); 
infra note 143 and accompanying text (discussing the multiple purposes, and particu-
larly the integrative purpose, set forth in the statutory findings of the ADA). 
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leads to several proposals for policy and doctrine on accommodation.  
Administrative agencies charged with facilitating implementation of 
the ADA should try to encourage employers to recognize and pro-
mote these benefits, not simply because they are good for society at 
large, but because they are good for the success of the ADA and the 
integration of disabled people into the workplace.  The EEOC should 
therefore revise its guidance on accommodations to encourage 
thoughtful disclosure of accommodations—subject to employee con-
sent—and to highlight third-party benefits.  The Job Accommodation 
Network ( JAN)3 should encourage employers to think about third-
party benefits when designing accommodations.  Courts, when using 
cost-benefit comparisons to decide whether accommodations are rea-
sonable or impose an undue hardship, should also recognize that ac-
commodations can have third-party (and second-party) benefits, as 
well as first-party benefits and costs and third-party costs.  Finally, insti-
tutional policymakers should appreciate the possibility of third-party 
benefits when deciding whether to include disability in their diversity 
initiatives alongside race and sex. 
This Article has five parts.  Part I creates a framework for recogniz-
ing third-party benefits.  This Part uses categories, diagrams, and ex-
amples to provide tools for seeing and enhancing such benefits.  Part 
II shows that, although courts have interpreted the accommodation 
requirement to require a comparison of costs and benefits, courts and 
other entities have nonetheless overlooked the third-party benefits of 
accommodations in surprising ways.  It then suggests some legal, po-
litical, and cultural reasons that benefits may be less salient than costs 
in discussions of the ADA.  Part III considers whether third-party 
benefits should matter to discussions and decisions about accommo-
dation.  I argue that, while accommodations should be designed prin-
cipally to facilitate the integration of people with disabilities, attend-
ing to the third-party benefits of accommodation furthers the ADA’s 
integrationist project by promoting positive attitudes toward disabled 
people.  Part IV discusses the implications of this analysis, highlighting 
ways that an appreciation of third-party benefits can affect legal analy-
sis, agency guidance, and institutional policy on the implementation 
of the ADA.  Finally, Part V identifies some concerns about focusing 
on third-party benefits—most importantly, that attending to third-
3 JAN is part of the Office of Disability Employment Policy of the U.S. Department 
of Labor.  JAN’s mission is “to facilitate the employment and retention of workers with 
disabilities.”  JAN, What Is JAN?, http://www.jan.wvu.edu/english/whatis.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 15, 2008). 
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party benefits could mislead employers and courts into thinking that 
the aim of the ADA is to improve welfare for everyone, rather than to 
prohibit discrimination and encourage integration of disabled people.  
Though this concern is important, the success of the ADA will ulti-
mately depend upon the attitudes of those who implement and live 
with the statute.  Therefore, recognition of third-party benefits is criti-
cal to achieving the aims of the statute. 
I.  IDENTIFYING THIRD-PARTY BENEFITS 
Whenever Dad started to do a new motion study project at a factory, he’d al-
ways begin by announcing he wanted to photograph the motions of the laziest 
man on the job. 
Cheaper by the Dozen 4
 
Accommodations prompt changes.  They introduce different ways 
of doing things, which sometimes alter and improve the environment 
for many people.  The father in Cheaper by the Dozen, an efficiency ex-
pert, studied the “laziest man in the factory” because the laziest man 
had reason to develop efficient ways to perform each task; similarly, we 
do well to study accommodations, not because of any link to laziness, 
but because disability creates a reason for innovative technologies and 
practices that can produce efficiencies and other types of benefits. 
Courts and agencies interpreting the ADA have ignored the third-
party benefits of accommodations, as I discuss in the next Part.  Thus, 
these benefits have generally been overlooked and undertheorized.  
This Part therefore uses examples of workplace accommodations to 
identify types of third-party benefits and aspects of accommodations 
that create such benefits.  Third parties include other disabled people, 
nondisabled people, and what I call the sub-ADA disabled.5  After dis-
tinguishing between usage and attitudinal benefits of accommodation, 
I then expand the discussion to consider the various categories of us-
age benefits that accrue to third parties from accommodations, in-
cluding material, physical, hedonic, relational, and, perhaps most in-
terestingly, experimentation benefits.  Some but not all of these third-
party benefits can be internalized by employers, as I will discuss.  I 
4 FRANK B. GILBRETH, JR. & ERNESTINE GILBRETH CAREY, CHEAPER BY THE DOZEN 
126 (1948). 
5 See supra text accompanying note 1. 
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conclude this Part by discussing how the design of accommodations 
affects whether they create benefits to third parties. 
A.  A Basic Spectrum of Third-Party Benefits 
We can imagine a spectrum with, on the right-hand side, accom-
modations with more third-party benefits, and on the left-hand side, 
those with fewer third-party benefits (if any).  A ramp, for example, 
might go on the far right side of the spectrum, because it can be used, 
currently and in the future, by both disabled and nondisabled people 
(e.g., for suitcases and strollers).6  On the far left, we might place a 
reader hired to read to a blind employee, because this accommoda-
tion’s benefits are, at first glance, completely coterminous with that 
disabled individual’s use of them.7  Somewhere in the middle is per-
haps the purchase of a reading machine that magnifies print or turns 
printed text into speech, which can be used by only one employee at a 
time but also can be used by other employees, now and in the future, 
when the person accommodated is not using the machine.8
 
Figure 1:  Basic Spectrum of Third-Party Benefits 
 
Fewer Benefits  More Benefits 
Reader Reading Machine Ramp 
 
These examples suggest three factors that affect the extent to which 
different accommodations produce third-party benefits:  (1) generaliza-
bility (whether others can benefit from the accommodation in the pre-
sent); (2) durability (whether others can benefit from the accommoda-
tion in the future); and (3) visibility or notoriety (whether the 
 
6 Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(A) (2000) (defining “reasonable accommodation” to 
include “making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable 
by individuals with disabilities”); Michael Ashley Stein, The Law and Economics of Disabil-
ity Accommodations, 53 DUKE L.J. 79, 88 (2003) (describing one category of accommoda-
tions as including those that “require[] the alteration or provision of a physical plant, 
such as ramping a stair to accommodate the needs of an employee who uses a wheel-
chair” (footnote omitted)). 
7 Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (defining “reasonable accommodation” to include 
“the provision of qualified readers or interpreters”); Nelson v. Thornburgh, 567 F. 
Supp. 369, 382 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (requiring readers for blind employees), aff’d, 732 F.2d 
146 (3d Cir. 1984). 
8 Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (defining “reasonable accommodation” to include 
the “acquisition or modification of equipment or devices”). 
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accommodation can be seen or known about by others, to whom it 
may signal something positive).9
We can now talk about the above examples in terms of these three 
factors, starting on the right side of the spectrum in Figure 1.  The 
ramp is generalizable, because it can be used by others; it is durable, 
because it can be used now and in the future; and it is visible, because 
it can be seen (or otherwise known about) by those inside and outside 
the workplace (depending on where it is positioned), who may infer 
from the ramp’s presence that the workplace is open to people with 
disabilities.  These signals might help to defeat (mal)adaptive prefer-
ences among disabled people who otherwise feel unemployable in cer-
tain places or unable to accomplish certain tasks.10  (These examples of 
course involve diverse kinds of benefits, affecting different groups of 
people, a complication that I will address in Sections B and C.) 
The reading machine may be used by others when the accommo-
dated employee is not using it, so it may be generalizable, and it can 
be used by others in the future, so it is durable.  Note that the reading 
machine’s generalizability is partially limited by its being rivalrous, in 
the sense that only one (or possibly a few) can use it at the same time.  
(The ramp is also somewhat rivalrous, though much less so, because 
many could use it without interfering meaningfully with anyone else’s 
use.)  The reading machine may not be very visible or notorious, in 
contrast to the ramp, because it is less likely to be seen by third parties. 
Finally, the reader for the blind employee appears, at least super-
ficially, to be neither generalizable, nor durable, nor especially visible. 
These factors quickly become more complicated, particularly the 
visibility/notoriety factor, when a bit of pressure is applied.  For ex-
ample, a reader for a blind employee may talk to people inside or out-
side the workplace about her job.  Or the reader might come to serve 
other functions, by gaining knowledge about the content of what she 
reads and lending that perspective, or, in a school setting, by becom-
ing an additional adult in the classroom who can help other children 
9 Cf. Stein, supra note 6, at 106-07 (including among the broad social benefits of 
accommodations “placing people with disabilities in a position to exercise the respon-
sibilities of citizenship, acknowledging that capable individuals have either a ‘right’ or 
an imperative to work, permitting the disabled to achieve dignity through labor and 
productivity, and realizing the values of a diverse society” (footnotes omitted)). 
10 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Why Markets Don’t Stop Discrimination, 8 SOC. PHIL. & 
POL’Y 22, 29-30 (1991); cf. JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES:  STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF 
RATIONALITY 109, 125-33 (1983). 
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or improve overall supervision.11  Or a business might include in its 
advertising the fact that it provides a reader for a blind employee.  
Perhaps, then, it is hard to imagine an accommodation that could 
never have a third-party benefit, at least of an expressive sort.  More-
over, a highly visible ramp may create benefits for some, but costs for 
others, such as those who find it aesthetically unappealing or resent its 
presence for other reasons.12  Such costs are always possible and make 
Pareto-optimality hard to achieve in this context.  As noted, though, 
the aim here is not to show that benefits exceed costs, but rather to 
say that there are benefits that are not fully recognized or realized. 
B.  Usage Versus Attitudinal Benefits 
This discussion of factors points us toward an important distinc-
tion between types of third-party benefits:  the difference between us-
age benefits and attitudinal benefits.  Usage benefits are those benefits 
that accrue to third parties through their use of the accommodations, 
directly or indirectly.  Thus, an accommodation’s generalizability 
principally concerns the extent of its usage benefits to third parties.  
Attitudinal benefits are the benefits that involve changes in attitudes—
toward disability, accommodation, and the ADA.  An accommoda-
tion’s visibility or notoriety affects the extent to which it can create at-
titudinal benefits.  Attitudinal benefits may or may not be considered 
benefits by the relevant third parties.  Rather, they are benefits from 
the perspective of the statutory aim of integrating people with disabili-
ties into the community and the workplace.  Part III focuses on attitu-
dinal benefits, and Part IV elaborates on the relation between attitu-
dinal and usage benefits.  The remainder of this Part discusses usage 
benefits.  But first, one further distinction. 
C.  Second- Versus Third-Party Benefits 
We can distinguish between second-party benefits, those that are in-
ternalized by the employer, and third-party benefits, those that re-
dound to coworkers or people outside the workplace but do not ulti-
mately benefit the employer.  Many or even most third-party benefits 
11 Anecdotal reports suggest that some parents prefer their children to be in 
classes with a disabled child who is assisted by an aide, who can help out in other ways 
and improve the child-teacher ratio. 
12 See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS:  THE CASE AGAINST EM-
PLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 480-94 (1992). 
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may also be second-party benefits.  Indeed, as Michael Stein and oth-
ers have pointed out, effective accommodations have a number of 
second-party benefits, such as reduced job turnover and absentee-
ism.13  Moreover, if an accommodation increases morale or productiv-
ity for coworkers, then an employer may internalize those benefits.14  
In theory at least, employers should be able to pay employees less (or 
charge customers more) to the extent that their jobs (or products) of-
fer more benefits.  Even if transaction costs prevent immediate rene-
gotiation of wages or prices, later pay raises or pricing might well ad-
just to reflect such benefits. 
Even in a frictionless world, though, not all third-party benefits 
will be internalized, including some that are particularly relevant to 
the subject of this Article.  For instance, improved attitudes toward 
people with disabilities or the ADA, the subject of Part III, are unlikely 
to be internalized by the employer.15  Thus, as with public goods more 
generally, employers may not have an incentive to create such bene-
fits.  Note also that the line between second- and third-party benefits is 
13 See Stein, supra note 6, at 104 (“One federal agency, for example, found that, on 
average, for every dollar spent on accommodation, companies saved $50 in net bene-
fits.  Thus, although more than one-half of accommodations cost less than $500, in 
two-thirds of those cases companies enjoyed net benefits exceeding $5000.” (footnotes 
omitted)).  For the claim that accommodations may also turn out to be good invest-
ments for the employer—by increasing productivity for that worker or other workers, 
or by attracting new customers—see Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabili-
ties, Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 23 (1996) (“The cost 
of reasonable accommodation may pay for itself in the greater productivity of the dis-
abled worker.”); J.H. Verkerke, Is the ADA Efficient?, 50 UCLA L. REV. 903, passim 
(2003) (arguing that the statutory requirement of reasonable accommodation pro-
motes labor market efficiencies by combating scarring and churning).  On the over-
looked second-party benefits that would have accrued from giving Barnett the accom-
modation of keeping his mailroom job, see Seth D. Harris, Re-Thinking the Economics of 
Discrimination:  U.S. Airways v. Barnett, the ADA, and the Application of Internal Labor 
Market Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 123, 178-79 (2003), and infra note 78 (discussing Harris 
on this point).  On the business case for accommodation and integrating disabled 
people into diversity initiatives more generally, see CHARLES A. RILEY II, DISABILITY AND 
BUSINESS:  BEST PRACTICES AND STRATEGIES FOR INCLUSION (2006). 
14 These fall into the category of the less calculable “ripple effects,” identified by 
Peter Blanck and discussed by Stein, that include “purported higher productivity, 
greater dedication, and better identification of qualified candidates for promotion”; 
“employers may also enjoy fewer insurance claims, reduced post-injury rehabilitation 
costs, [and] an improved corporate culture.”  Stein, supra note 6, at 105 (footnotes 
omitted) (discussing PETER DAVID BLANCK, COMMUNICATING THE AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES ACT:  TRANSCENDING COMPLIANCE:  A CASE REPORT ON SEARS ROEBUCK 
AND CO. (1994), available at http://www.annenberg.northwestern.edu/pubs/sears/). 
15 However, improved attitudes toward people with disabilities might improve 
teamwork or morale, and thus increase productivity. 
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not always easy to draw.  For example, as Stein observes, the benefits 
to society of integrating people with disabilities—such as a societal 
culture of productivity encouraged by increased employment levels 
and self-sufficiency among people with disabilities generally—can help 
to create better labor pools, which may ultimately benefit employers.16  
These are benefits that arise from effective accommodations in gen-
eral, rather than from any particular accommodations.  For the pur-
poses of this Part, it is not important to determine which third-party 
benefits will be internalized.  The aim here is to identify the ways that 
accommodations can have third-party benefits and to outline key 
categories of such benefits. 
D.  Types of Third-Party Usage Benefits 
Accommodations positively affect workplaces and other environ-
ments in a variety of ways, as several commentators have noted.17  This 
Part outlines specific types of usage benefits in order to help make 
visible their range and significance:  (1) material benefits, (2) physical 
benefits, (3) hedonic benefits, (4) relational benefits, and (5) ex-
perimentation benefits.  I will briefly discuss the first three categories, 
which are relatively self-explanatory and continuous with the preced-
ing discussion, before turning to the last two categories.  These five 
categories are not discrete, but overlapping. 
(1) Material.  Accommodations may materially benefit others in 
the workplace by making them more productive or reducing their 
workload.  New equipment or an office redesign that makes lifting 
16 Stein, supra note 6, at 106-07. 
17 See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE 84-86 (1990) (discuss-
ing, for example, the benefits to all students if a classroom teacher were to accommo-
date a deaf student by teaching all students sign language and teaching in sign and 
spoken language at the same time); Jerry L. Mashaw, Against First Principles, 31 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 211, 223-24 (1994) (noting spillover benefits in public transportation 
systems, factories, and sidewalk-street interfaces); Stein, supra note 6, at 104-08 (dis-
cussing second- and third-party benefits, as explained supra notes 13-16); see also infra 
notes 26, 74 (discussing important work by Peter Blanck and colleagues on second- 
and third-party benefits).  Douglas Leslie asserts that in a small survey he found only 
one case in which an accommodation could have benefited multiple employees, but 
his example—a challenge to an employer’s refusal to hire employees who failed a 
nerve conduction test—does not come from a failure to accommodate case.  Douglas 
L. Leslie, Accommodating the Employment Disabled, 17 LAB. LAW. 143, 151 (2001).  Leslie 
rejects as irrelevant to accommodation analysis the potential third-party benefits to fu-
ture employees with the same disability, such as future asthma sufferers after an em-
ployer grants one accommodation to an asthma sufferer, without considering the rele-
vance of the doctrinal focus on cost-benefit balancing.  Id. at 151 n.13. 
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easier for an employee with a disability may make lifting easier for 
everyone.18  Taller dividers on office cubicles to help one employee 
with a cognitive or psychiatric disability to concentrate may have the 
same benefit for others, more or less disabled.19  And, of course, 
ramps and elevators make it easier for anyone to move heavy objects 
or objects on wheels. 
(2) Physical.  Some accommodations may have health benefits for 
others in the workplace.  An employee whose asthma requires special 
air filtering or a smoke-free environment may improve the air quality 
for others.20  Lifting equipment designed or purchased for the em-
ployee with a back injury may not only increase productivity but may 
also ease back strain for others—including those who currently have 
no back problems or only minor back problems.  Note here that the 
sub-ADA population may include anyone in the workplace who has 
18 Cf. Penny v. UPS, 128 F.3d 408, 415-17 (6th Cir. 1997) (discussing an em-
ployee’s request for, inter alia, new equipment to help delivery of heavy packages de-
spite a back impairment, and ultimately dismissing the claim on the basis that his back 
impairment was not substantially limiting enough). 
19 Cf. EEOC, EEOC NOTICE NO. 915.002, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES (1997) [hereinaf-
ter EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES], available at http:// 
www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/psych.html (“[R]oom dividers, partitions, or other sound-
proofing or visual barriers between workspaces may accommodate individuals who 
have disability-related limitations in concentration.”); cf. also JAN, Accommodation Ex-
amples:  Psychiatric Impairments, http://www.jan.wvu.edu/soar/psych/psychex.html 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2008) (discussing other accommodations for concentration diffi-
culties caused by psychiatric disabilities, such as quiet time away from other tasks to 
work toward goals uninterrupted, headphones to listen to music for relaxation during 
some tasks, weekly goal meetings with supervisors that are recorded for later review 
and recall, and a more flexible schedule to make time for counseling and exercise). 
20 Cf. Webb v. Clyde L. Choate Mental Health & Dev. Ctr., 230 F.3d 991, 994, 998-
99 (7th Cir. 2000) (discussing requests by an asthmatic employee for, inter alia, a venti-
lated office and prior notice of use of chemicals, and ultimately dismissing the case on 
the basis that, inter alia, the plaintiff is not substantially limited in the major life activity 
of working); Hendler v. Intelecom USA, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 200, 207, 209 (E.D.N.Y. 
1997) (declining to award summary judgment to an employer, on the grounds of lack 
of disability or insufficient evidence of a hostile work environment, in a case involving 
an asthmatic plaintiff who had been promised a smoke-free work environment).  By 
contrast, in a move that is relevant to the upcoming Section on designing accommoda-
tions, an accommodation that involves merely transferring the asthmatic employee to 
another work space with less allergens may create third-party costs by requiring an-
other coworker to work in the more allergenic space.  Cf. Cassidy v. Detroit Edison Co., 
138 F.3d 629, 634-35 (6th Cir. 1998) (discussing an employee’s request for a transfer to 
an allergen-free work area and rejecting this request as too vague to be reasonable or 
as unavailable).  Also, of course, a no-smoking rule may be a health benefit to all, but it 
is nonetheless a hedonic cost to those who wish to smoke, as the allegedly harassing 
comments in the Hendler case reflect.  See 963 F. Supp. at 202. 
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minor pain or difficulty with particular activities; there may also be a 
disproportionate benefit to certain groups, such as older workers, who 
are more likely to develop disabilities and who may also be more likely 
to fall into this sub-ADA grouping.21  Ergonomic furniture and office 
design also benefit coworkers by easing strain and preventing inju-
ries.22  This is well known to the many academics who have sought as-
sistive devices to prevent the worsening of mild forms of repetitive 
stress injuries, which, under Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. 
v. Williams, are unlikely to constitute ADA disabilities even if they be-
come more serious.23
(3) Hedonic.  Some accommodations involve changes to the 
workplace that make some workers happier in their jobs.  For in-
stance, if early morning team meetings are moved later in the day to 
accommodate an employee whose psychotropic medications make it 
difficult to get up in the morning, coworkers who are not early risers 
may benefit.24  (This accommodation, like others, could also create 
costs for some third parties—for example, a coworker who prefers 
early morning meetings.25)  Accommodations for employees with 
mental illness sometimes involve the development of new workplace 
21 See, e.g., RILEY, supra note 13, at 82.  Riley notes that “one-fourth of all disabili-
ties are incurred by those who are sixty-five and older.”  Id.  Riley is not specifically re-
ferring to the ADA’s narrow definition of disability (as interpreted by the courts), so 
surely many older folks are also among the sub-ADA disabled.  They may constitute an 
even greater fraction of the sub-ADA group, to the extent that many of their disabilities 
develop gradually with age. 
22 According to Beth Loy and John Greer, 
Ergonomics is the science of fitting jobs to people.  The discipline encom-
passes a body of knowledge about physical abilities and limitations as well as 
other human characteristics that are relevant to job design.  Essentially, ergo-
nomics is the relationship between the worker and the job and focuses on the 
design of work areas to enhance job performance.  Ergonomics can help pre-
vent injuries and limit secondary injuries as well as accommodate individuals 
with various disabilities, including those with musculoskeletal disorders . . . . 
Beth Loy & John Greer, JAN, Ergonomics in the Workplace:  A Resource Guide, http:// 
www.jan.wvu.edu/media/ergo.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2008). 
23 See 534 U.S. 184, 202-03 (2002) (reversing the lower court decision that the 
plaintiff’s carpal tunnel syndrome was a disability and remanding for a reevaluation of 
the facts under a standard requiring that her impairment substantially limit her in 
tasks that are of central importance to most people’s daily lives). 
24 Interview with Lauren B. Gates, Senior Research Scientist & Research Dir., Ctr. 
for Soc. Pol’y & Practice in the Workplace, Columbia Univ. Sch. of Soc. Work, in N.Y., 
N.Y. (Nov. 21, 2006). 
25 See infra Part I.F (discussing how the design of accommodations can affect the 
extent of third-party benefits as opposed to costs). 
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policies and practices:  training in management skills for supervisors, 
better clarification of work-team members’ talents and responsibilities, 
or the creation of clearer and more thoughtful policies about violence 
in the workplace.26  Accommodations for concentration problems—
such as quiet, uninterrupted time to complete tasks, or the option to 
wear music headphones while doing noninteractive work—may also 
be useful to nondisabled (and to sub-ADA-disabled) employees.  
Changes such as these may make employees not only more produc-
tive, but more content. 
(4) Relational.  Accommodations may also have relational benefits.  
That is, an accommodation may create benefits for third parties by 
permitting a particular disabled person’s presence in the workplace.  
Relational benefits are generally attitudinal benefits, which are the 
subject of the next Part, rather than usage benefits.  But there are sev-
eral kinds of relational benefits that fall more within the domain of 
usage benefits, in the sense that they directly improve the work or lives 
of third parties.  Most simply, relational benefits include the benefits 
of having a particular individual, with her particular skills and talents, 
in the workplace; these benefits are due to the accommodation be-
cause the accommodation makes it possible for the accommodated 
worker to enter or remain in the workplace.  People with disabilities 
may develop distinct skills or talents, or more efficient ways of doing 
things, to compensate for their impairments or the challenges pre-
26 See, e.g., Interview with Lauren B. Gates, supra note 24; see also Susan Sturm & 
Howard Gadlin, Conflict Resolution and Systemic Change, 2007 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 22-27 
(discussing, in an empirical study of the work of the Ombudsman’s Office at the NIH, 
systemic interventions in response to individual conflicts surrounding mental illness).  
On improved interactions with coworkers and other indirect benefits of accommoda-
tions, see Helen A. Schartz, D.J. Hendricks & Peter Blanck, Workplace Accommodations:  
Evidence Based Outcomes, 27 WORK 345 (2006), who find the following: 
The most frequently reported indirect benefits were improved interactions 
with co-workers (69.3%), increased overall company morale (60.7%), and in-
creased overall company productivity (57.0%).  Other reported indirect bene-
fits included improved interactions with customers (42%), increased work-
place safety (42.3%), and increased overall company attendance (36.0%).  
Increased profitability was reported by more than a quarter of the respon-
dents (29.4%).  Increased customer base (15.5%) and other indirect benefits 
(9.0%) were reported. 
Id. at 349.  See also Helen A. Schartz et al., Workplace Accommodations:  Empirical Study of Cur-
rent Employees, 75 MISS. L.J. 917, 943 (2006) (concluding from an empirical study that al-
though most accommodation costs are low, the resultant benefits are relatively high). 
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sented by a disabling environment.27  There is also research that sug-
gests potential cost savings to retaining an employee rather than going 
through the process of finding and training a new employee.28  Ac-
commodations may help retention by allowing a particular employee 
to remain in the workplace, and, some have argued, may create par-
ticularly loyal employees.29  The administrative burdens of hiring new 
employees translate not only into costs to employers, but also create 
potential burdens that fall directly on other employees who must help 
to find, train, and build relationships with new employees.30  Retaining 
an employee by accommodating her can avoid such costs to coworkers. 
(5) Experimentation.  Necessity inspires invention, in the realm of 
disability as elsewhere.  Experimentation benefits include both new 
technologies and improved processes. 
(a) Technologies.  Experimentation is a general theme of disability 
accommodation, inside and outside the workplace.  Many technolo-
gies developed for people with particular disabilities are also useful for 
nondisabled people, including closed captioning, voice-to-text tech-
27 See, e.g., Harlan Hahn, New Trends in Disability Studies:  Implications for Educational 
Policy, in INCLUSION AND SCHOOL REFORM:  TRANSFORMING AMERICA’S CLASSROOMS 
315, 327 (Dorothy Kerzner Lipsky & Alan Gartner eds., 1997) (“Many young people 
with disabilities have displayed capacities to respond successfully to unusually difficult 
challenges that are similar to the traits educators have increasingly identified as the 
hallmark of students who are perceived as especially talented or gifted.  People with 
disabilities also may acquire unusual adaptation skills as a result of their continuous 
efforts to cope with an inhospitable environment.”). 
28 See, e.g., Schartz, Hendricks & Blanck, supra note 26, at 349 (“The vast majority 
of employers reported that the accommodation allowed the company to retain 
(87.1%), hire (16.7%), or promote (11.5%) a qualified or valued employee.  Almost 
three-quarters (73.8%) reported that the accommodation increased the affected em-
ployee’s productivity.  More than half (55.4%) reported that the accommodation 
eliminated the cost of training a new employee.  More than half (50.5%) reported it 
increased the accommodated employee’s attendance.  Other common direct benefits 
reported include saving on workers’ compensation and other insurance (41.8%), and 
increased diversity of the company (43.8%).”); Stein, supra note 6, at 104-05 (discuss-
ing research indicating that “the provision of accommodations [is] often profitable for 
employers”); see also Verkerke, supra note 13, at 935 (contemplating the conditions 
where the ADA’s accommodation requirements may help to avoid the costs associated 
with churning and scarring). 
29 See, e.g., RILEY, supra note 13, at 126 (quoting a publicist for Sears on the “ele-
ment of loyalty” that can be created by accommodating new or existing employees); see 
also supra note 28 (quoting relevant findings by Schartz, Hendricks & Blanck). 
30 See generally supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
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nologies, scanners, large print books and readers, books on tape, sock 
sorters, and the phonograph.31
These broader uses of disability-related innovations might be 
analogized to what evolutionary theorists call exaptations, which are 
traits (i.e., aptations, the progress-neutral variation on the term adapta-
tion) that emerge for one purpose and then turn out to be useful for 
another purpose.32  For example, in certain species of birds, evolu-
tionary evidence suggests that wings and feathers were adapted for in-
sulation or for catching prey, and then later exapted for flying.33  
Likewise, closed captioning was developed for deaf watchers of televi-
sion, and then exapted for the public in airports or sports clubs where 
the sound of the television would be inaudible or aggravating.34  (Ap-
parently, closed captioning is also used on national television in 
China, where the variety of dialects means that no single version of 
the spoken language would be comprehensible to much of the popu-
lation.35)  Similarly, “baby sign language,” an exaptation of American 
Sign Language, has recently become popular among parents in the 
United States, because children can learn to communicate by signing 
before they are able to talk.36
(b) Processes.  Disability accommodations can lead not only to inno-
vative technology, but also to innovative processes.  For instance, vari-
ous educational techniques devised for students with disabilities help 
many other kinds of students learn more effectively.  Some educators 
31 See, e.g., RILEY, supra note 13, at 81; Eric A. Taub, The Blind Leading the Sighted, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1999, at G1.  For an entertaining example, see A Small, Belated Step 
for Grammarians, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2006, at A19, which recounts how a computer pro-
grammer found evidence that Neil Armstrong said “one small step for a man” rather 
than “one small step for man,” resolving a longstanding dispute, by using software de-
signed to allow people with certain disabilities to communicate through computers 
using nerve impulses. 
32 See Stephen Jay Gould & Elisabeth S. Vrba, Exaptation—A Missing Term in the Sci-
ence of Form, 8 PALEOBIOLOGY 4, 6 (1982). 
33 Id. at 8. 
34 Like the example in the Introduction, closed captioning is another accommo-
dation that may be useful to many audience members at conferences and in other 
learning environments.  Only a fraction of people learn well aurally; others learn bet-
ter in other ways, such as visually.  On this basis, one author has argued that disability 
accommodations in law school classrooms—which sometimes involve professors chang-
ing their teaching methods—can benefit many students.  Jennifer Jolly-Ryan, Disabilities 
to Exceptional Abilities:  Law Students with Disabilities, Nontraditional Learners, and the Law 
Teacher as a Learner, 6 NEV. L.J. 116, 146-55 (2005). 
35 Thanks to Ben Liebman for this point. 
36 See, e.g., MONTA Z. BRIANT, BABY SIGN LANGUAGE BASICS (2004); JOSEPH GARCIA, 
SIGN WITH YOUR BABY 18 (1999). 
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have formalized this approach as Universal Instructional Design 
(UID), a term that piggybacks on the general principle of Universal 
Design.37  (Universal Design is a systematic approach to designing en-
vironments and products so that all people can use them without 
modification.38)  Others have characterized disability mainstreaming 
as a crucial design feature of the so-called third wave of educational 
reform, which views differences as strengths, emphasizes active learn-
ing, and aims to prevent learning disabilities by improving the overall 
educational program.39
In the workplace, accommodations may lead to changed policies 
and practices that have wider applicability.  For instance, accommoda-
37 See, e.g., Patricia Silver, Andrew Bourke & K.C. Strehorn, Universal Instructional 
Design in Higher Education:  An Approach for Inclusion, EQUITY & EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., 
Sept. 1998, at 47, 49 (describing the views of UID held by university professors, admit-
tedly UID-friendly enough to be involved in this pilot study, who thought that “their 
diverse teaching methods may benefit all students” and that “they have been informed 
of the diverse learning styles by the presentation of diverse learners in their classes 
(e.g., students with learning disabilities)”); see also Jolly-Ryan, supra note 34 (discussing 
Jolly-Ryan’s work urging law professors to improve their teaching methods for all stu-
dents by accommodating disabled students).  Exciting work in a similar vein is the ef-
fort, spearheaded by Martha Minow, to forge the legal and technological innovations 
necessary to produce textbooks and other curricular materials in a format that is acces-
sible to children with a wide range of disabilities.  For a description of this effort, see 
Emily Newburger, Book Smart, HARV. L. BULL., Summer 2004, available at http:// 
www.law.harvard.edu/alumni/bulletin/2004/summer/feature_5-1.php.  See also CAST 
Universal Design for Learning, National Center on Accessing the General Curriculum 
(NCAC), http://www.cast.org/policy/ncac/index.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2008) (de-
scribing the NCAC, which seeks to “create practical approaches for improved access to 
the general curriculum by students with disabilities”). 
38 See The Center for Universal Design, About UD:  Universal Design Principles, 
http://www.design.ncsu.edu/cud/about_ud/udprincipleshtmlformat.html (last vis-
ited Feb. 15, 2008) (defining Universal Design as “the design of products and envi-
ronments to be usable by all people, to the greatest extent possible, without the need 
for adaptation or specialized design,” and setting out seven principles for Universal 
Design:  “equitable use”; “flexibility in use”; “simple and intuitive”; “perceptible infor-
mation”; “tolerance for error”; “low physical effort”; and “size and space for ap-
proach and use”); see also Ronald L. Mace, Founder, Ctr. for Universal Design, A Per-
spective on Universal Design, Presentation at Hofstra University for Designing for the 
21st Century:  An International Conference on Universal Design (excerpt from re-
marks given June 19, 1998), available at http://www.design.ncsu.edu/cud/about_us/ 
usronmacespeech.htm (“I have never seen a building or facility I would say is univer-
sally usable.  I don’t know that it’s possible to create one. . . . It’s not that there’s a 
weakness in the term.  We use that term because it’s the most descriptive of what the 
goal is, something people can live with and afford.”). 
39 See Dorothy Kerzner Lipsky & Alan Gartner, The Third Wave of School Reform, in 
INCLUSION AND SCHOOL REFORM, supra note 27, at 235, 235-41; see also Personal Com-
munication with Shael Polakow-Suransky, Chief Academic Officer, Empowerment Sch., 
N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., in N.Y., N.Y. (Oct. 17, 2006). 
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tions for employees with psychiatric disabilities often involve modifica-
tions of schedules or workplace practices or policies, as opposed to 
changes in the physical environment.40  These modifications operate 
as experiments in what is possible or desirable in the workplace.  For 
instance, giving a disabled employee the option of flextime—to work 
late one day in order to leave work early the next day for a therapy 
appointment—may reveal flextime to be feasible for many.  In addi-
tion, as noted earlier, the presence of mental disability may require bet-
ter management, which can lead to improved institutional processes.41
Note that experimenting with processes may also challenge estab-
lished conventions or norms.  For instance, in a context far from the 
workplace, Simi Linton tells of a blind friend who is permitted to 
touch works of art at the Museum of Modern Art, wearing rubber 
gloves—a practice that is at once controversial among curators and yet 
linked to larger trends in conceptual art and curatorial practices that 
emphasize experiential appreciation of art.42
40 It is difficult to determine precisely which types of accommodation for psychiat-
ric disabilities are most common, since, as others have noted, there is no consistent 
mode of categorization of accommodations for psychiatric disabilities, making it diffi-
cult to compare studies of these accommodations to one another.  See Kim L. Mac-
Donald-Wilson et al., An Investigation of Reasonable Workplace Accommodations for People 
with Psychiatric Disabilities:  Quantitative Findings from a Multi-Site Study, 38 COMMUNITY 
MENTAL HEALTH J. 35, 36 (2002).  But it seems fair to say that accommodations for 
people with mental illness more often involve changes to policies or practices.  Cf. 42 
U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (2000) (defining “reasonable accommodation” as including “job 
restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant posi-
tion, . . . appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials 
or policies, . . . and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities”); 
Stein, supra note 6, at 88 (noting that “[r]easonable accommodations” can involve not 
only the physical alteration of the workplace, but also “the alteration of the way in 
which a job is performed”).  For instance, three representative accommodations re-
quested for psychiatric disabilities are (1) modifying an employee’s schedule—e.g., 
allowing an employee to leave one hour early one day a week for therapy; (2) changing 
supervisory practices—e.g., allowing a job coach to participate in meetings with super-
visors, or modifying how a supervisor gives criticism or assignments; and (3) changing 
where or how an employee works—e.g., allowing an employee to telecommute. 
41 See supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing relevant findings by Sturm 
and Gadlin, among others); see also infra Part IV.B (discussing Gates’s work on this 
topic in more detail). 
42 See SIMI LINTON, MY BODY POLITIC:  A MEMOIR 221 (2006) (noting that “hands-
on” art has been a recent movement and has encouraged the view that physical en-
gagement with art “results in enhanced learning”); see also Nick Paumgarten, Do Not 
Touch, NEW YORKER, Nov. 27, 2006, at 90 (describing how visually-impaired museum 
visitors are occasionally encouraged to touch the art, which enhances their experi-
ence).  Even more controversially, as Linton notes, in 2000 a Pussycat Club in East Sus-
sex, England, requested a variance from its no-touching policy to permit blind patrons 
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(c) Contingent Versus Automatic Benefits.  Experimentation benefits 
highlight an interesting wrinkle to the third-party benefits of some ac-
commodations:  these benefits may not automatically accrue to third 
parties.  Rather, third-party benefits are often contingent on interven-
ing steps—on the success of the experiment and an employer’s (or 
sometimes a coworker’s) recognition of that success.  If accommoda-
tion experiments are successful from the employer’s perspective—
because, for example, the accommodations reduce costs or increase 
productivity—the employer may permit other employees (disabled, 
nondisabled, or sub-ADA-disabled) to avail themselves of these modi-
fied arrangements.43  For instance, a telecommuting initiative—an ac-
commodation that will be discussed in more detail later—can reduce 
the costs of office space and give employers and employees efficiency 
gains by reducing time spent commuting.44
Alternatively, experiments prompted by accommodation may 
benefit third parties if the experiments give information to coworkers 
about what is possible in the workplace.  This is akin to an argument 
made by Ruth O’Brien that the ADA has significant potential to make 
the workplace far more tailored to individuals, in part because the in-
teractive process for disabled people will reveal information about 
how workplaces can or could operate.45  This additional information 
may give coworkers ideas for improvements or leverage to negotiate 
to touch the dancers.  The dancers themselves were involved in the proposal, as the 
owner of the club explained in his letter to the council seeking the variance: 
I have conducted a “straw poll,” and eleven of the fifteen dancers consulted 
would possibly agree to controlled touching in special circumstances.  The con-
sensus among the eleven was that any touching should be voluntary, restricted to 
the breasts, and should occur only when the dancer is wearing a bra (i.e., not 
topless).  Furthermore, it would be acceptable only where the dancer had full 
control, and the proposal is that she would take one hand/arm of the blind cus-
tomer and place it on her breast(s), whilst dancing, for an agreed time. 
Letter from Kenneth McGrath, Dancer in the Dark, HARPER’S MAG., Oct. 1, 2001, at 19, 
22.  To some, a reconsideration of no-touch policies in museums, or in strip clubs, may 
be a cost—threatening whatever those rules were meant to protect—while for others 
this rethinking may be an instance of disability creating welcome pressure to recon-
sider path-dependent practices that may or may not be well justified.  As Linton puts 
the latter view, “Maybe, though, blind people are forcing the rest of us to reconsider 
the social conventions and rules that govern breast touching, bronze and otherwise.”  
LINTON, supra, at 218. 
43 See Stein, supra note 6, at 105-06 (citing BLANCK, supra note 14). 
44 See infra Part III.B. 
45 See RUTH O’BRIEN, BODIES IN REVOLT 2, 135 (2005) (arguing that the ADA’s 
employment provisions “create a model for interjecting a notion of workplace need 
that is based on our individuality”). 
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with employers.  The current EEOC guidelines on disclosure of ac-
commodations inhibit this kind of information transmission, however, 
as I discuss in Part IV. 
The distinction between contingent and automatic benefits helps 
to sort accommodations with reference to whether their third-party 
benefits are predictable or unpredictable, immediate or long-term.  As 
we shall see later in relation to telecommuting, though, what could be 
a contingent benefit—if an employer decides on a case-by-case basis 
whether to allow others to telecommute—can become effectively 
automatic if the employer takes the occasion of accommodating the 
person with a disability to devise a broader structural or policy change 
to the workplace. 
E.  Why Haven’t They Done It Already? 
One might ask:  if telecommuting or some other accommodation 
is so broadly beneficial, then why doesn’t our hypothetical employer 
already permit it?  This is an intriguing question, and one that could 
be asked about any of the examples discussed in this Part, though it is 
particularly suggested by the experimentation examples.  The first an-
swer is that, as I have noted, nothing in this analysis requires that the 
benefits exceed the costs, particularly to the employer, so employers 
simply may not have incentives to create these initiatives in the ab-
sence of accommodation demands.46
The more interesting answer concerns those situations in which 
employers may not take certain steps, even if the benefits the em-
ployer can internalize would ultimately outweigh the costs.  In short, 
workplace rules and practices may be subject to inertia or otherwise 
self-reinforcing.  Though markets certainly encourage much innova-
tion, market forces do not reveal all effective practices, particularly 
those involving workplace rules, for a number of reasons. 
Status quo bias and system justification may support existing 
workplace practices.47  In Martha Minow’s words, we tend to assume 
46 In addition, there may be greater up-front costs in a systemwide change. 
47 See, e.g., Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, System Justification Theory and Research:  Implica-
tions for Law, Legal Advocacy, and Social Justice, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1119, 1119 (2006) (dis-
cussing, as the focus of “system justification theory,” “the motive to defend and justify 
the social status quo, even among those who are seemingly most disadvantaged by it”); 
Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1228-
29 (2003) (explaining “status quo bias” as the tendency of “individuals . . . to prefer the 
present state of the world to alternative states, all other things being equal”); Michelle 
A. Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential of Employment Discrimination Law, 62 
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that “the status quo [is] good, natural, and freely chosen.”48  Individ-
ual cognitive shortcomings can be magnified rather than corrected by 
firm structure, and a firm’s mechanisms for coping with individual 
shortcomings can lead to pathologies of their own.49  Organizations 
may develop routines to facilitate smooth operations, but these useful 
structures can have a “dark side”50:  for instance, they may lead deci-
sion makers to approach problems with a particular decision frame in 
mind, and thus cause them to ignore new or unfamiliar information 
and to underestimate risks.51  Changes prompted by disability may well 
involve changes to the basic environment or assumptions of a work-
place, changes that might not otherwise come readily to mind.  As 
John Donohue has observed, responding in another context to the 
claim that if a practice is efficient, it would have been adopted already, 
“The human mind finds it far easier to make the best out of the cur-
rent state of the world than it does trying to conceive all of the ways in 
which the state of the world itself can be altered.”52
The meaning of this of course depends on what it means to “make 
the best out of the current state of the world” as opposed to reimagin-
ing the state of the world.  But it makes sense that disability would 
help us see possible ways to improve the state of the world for every-
one.  Disabilities vary widely, and disability is also typically on a spec-
trum with nondisability, and so disability occurs when some interac-
tion between a person’s body or mind and the environment is so 
costly that it substantially limits that person.  But many other people 
may be experiencing costs along those lines as well; those costs just 
don’t rise to a level that causes people to take notice or find solutions.  
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 19-21 (2005) (using “system justification theory” to explain the 
“workplace essentialism” that prompts courts to treat the status quo in the workplace—
especially the “full-time face-time norm”—as essential and thus impervious to ADA and 
Title VII claims that would involve considering alternative ways to do the same jobs). 
48 Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term—Foreword:  Justice Engendered, 101 
HARV. L. REV. 10, 55 (1987). 
49 See, e.g., Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation:  Private Firms, Decision-
making, and Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377, 417-20 (2006). 
50 See generally Diane Vaughan, The Dark Side of Organizations:  Mistake, Misconduct, 
and Disaster, 25 ANN. REV. SOC. 271 (1999). 
51 See Bamberger, supra note 49, at 420-23. 
52 John J. Donohue III, Commentary, Opting for the British Rule, or If Posner and 
Shavell Can’t Remember the Coase Theorem, Who Will?, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1093, 1115 
(1991).  For some examples of where markets fail to produce benefits that would be 
internalized in the environmental context, see generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, NUDGE:  IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 
(forthcoming 2008). 
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For example, think of curbs, which, in the absence of curb cuts, re-
quire everyone to step up.  This is a cost for people with minimally 
bad knees; in fact, it is some cost for everyone.53  But society may no-
tice the cost, and devise the solution of curb cuts, only when faced 
with people for whom the costs are truly significant. 
F.  Designing Accommodations:  A Broader Spectrum of Costs and Benefits 
Different accommodations can create more or fewer benefits to 
third parties; they can also create third-party costs or benefits.  This 
Section therefore returns to the spectrum introduced in Section A 
and broadens it to include costs as well as benefits.  This broader spec-
trum shows the significance of the design and choice of accommoda-
tions, as well as the rules or conventions surrounding them. 
If a disabled employee is unable to perform certain marginal func-
tions of her job, then her coworkers may have to perform those func-
tions instead.  If those tasks are unappealing or add to a busy co-
worker’s set of tasks, then they simply create costs.  By contrast, if an 
employee’s disability prompts a change to the workplace—to its physi-
cal structure or to the structure of jobs—then that accommodation 
may create a variety of benefits or costs for other workers. 
Think in the public accommodations context of the difference be-
tween disabled parking spaces and curb cuts.  Both benefit wheelchair 
users, but parking spaces are apparently zero-sum, while curb cuts can 
be used by everyone and, once constructed, create costs for few.54  In 
the language of public goods, parking spaces are rivalrous while curb 
cuts are (relatively) nonrivalrous.  Similarly, writing about parent-
centered policies, Mary Anne Case contrasts those initiatives that bene-
fit many with those that favor parents to the detriment of nonparents: 
Compare two different ways of arguing that greater access to public 
space be afforded to parents and their children:  Joan Tronto laments 
on behalf of parents “the absence of viable forms of social support that 
range from adequate public transportation to ‘safe’ public spaces such as 
neighborhood streets on which children play.”  Hewlett and West, by 
contrast, propose that “[s]uburban communities could offer priority 
53 See also infra Part I.F (discussing curb cuts as an example from the public ac-
commodations context). 
54 Many people have made the point about curb cuts, including, for example, 
Mashaw, supra note 17, at 223-24.  On the other hand, curb cuts may create costs for 
people with vision impairments, who cannot feel where the curb ends (though ridges 
can help with this); they may also invite the nuisance of cyclists cycling on sidewalks 
(though the curb cuts are surely a boon to the cyclists). 
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parking in shopping malls for pregnant women and parents with small 
children (a few do already), and the federal government could offer free 
or discounted admission to national parks, monuments, and museums so 
that moms and dads could always afford to accompany their children.”
55
“Not only,” Case observes, “does the former proposal sound like an 
equal right and the latter like a special right, the former is coalition 
building, the latter has real zero-sum potential.”56
We can extend our spectrum from Figure 1 to take into account 
that an accommodation may create costs as well as benefits for third 
parties.  Curb cuts, like improved public transportation, are available 
for use by everyone; disabled parking spaces, like priority parking for 
parents, are for use only by the designated group, although they were 
formerly available to everyone.57
 
Figure 2:  An Expanded Spectrum from Third-Party Costs to Benefits 
 
More Costs (Context) More Benefits 
Disabled Parking Spaces (Disability) Curb Cuts 
Priority Parents Parking (Parents) Improved Public Transportation 
 
Disabled restrooms occupy a middle (or uncertain) ground, de-
pending largely on how they are understood and used, which varies by 
local norms.  In Britain, the use of accessible toilets by those who are 
not disabled is apparently a source of significant debate and animos-
ity.  These tensions have led to complaints by less visibly disabled peo-
ple who may encounter interpersonal obstacles in trying to use acces-
sible toilets.58  By contrast, in the United States, the issue seems 
 
55 Mary Anne Case, How High the Apple Pie?  A Few Troubling Questions About Where, 
Why, and How the Burden of Care for Children Should Be Shifted, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1753, 
1770 (2001) (footnote omitted) (quoting Joan C. Tronto, Who Cares?  Public and Private 
Caring and the Rethinking of Citizenship, in WOMEN AND WELFARE:  THEORY AND PRACTICE 
IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 65 (Nancy J. Hirschmann & Ulrike Liebert eds., 
2001), and Sylvia Ann Hewlett & Cornel West, Caring for Crib Lizards, AM. PROSPECT, 
Jan. 1-15, 2001, at 17, 19). 
56 Id. 
57 For an interesting discussion of reports on how the broader public informally 
enforces the rules restricting designated parking spaces to people with disabilities, see 
Geoffrey P. Miller, Norm Enforcement in the Public Sphere:  The Case of Handicapped Parking, 
71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 895 (2003). 
58 See J. Bichard, J. Hanson & C. Greed, Away from Home (Public) Toilet Design:  Iden-
tifying User Wants, Needs and Aspirations, in DESIGNING ACCESSIBLE TECHNOLOGY 227 
( John Clarkson et al. eds., 2006) (discussing debates in Britain surrounding the use of 
disabled restrooms by nondisabled people); VivaCity2020 Publications, http:// 
www.vivacity2020.eu/publications/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2008) (providing “Toilet Paper 
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relatively less fraught, though a measure of uncertainty surrounds the 
question—as indicated, for instance, by an episode of Randy Cohen’s 
call-in radio program, The Ethicist, dedicated to the topic.59  The norm 
seems contested in the United States, but generally more favorable 
toward nondisabled people using accessible stalls than in Britain.60
 
Figure 3:  A Spectrum of Public Accommodations Examples 
 
More Costs  More Benefits 
Disabled Parking Spaces (Accessible Toilets) Curb Cuts 
 
If norms invite everyone to use these toilets, then nondisabled 
people may benefit from roomier stalls, particularly if they have lug-
gage or children in tow.  But if these toilets are used only by people 
with disabilities, their presence may mean fewer available restrooms, 
longer waits, and possibly even smaller (inaccessible) stalls.  One diffi-
cult question, though, is whether use of these stalls by the broader 
public interferes with their use by people with disabilities.  Though in 
principle most people would presumably defer to a person with a dis-
 
Newsletters” discussing the same); see also infra note 216 and accompanying text (quot-
ing a British wheelchair user’s complaint on the subject). 
59 All Things Considered:  The Ethicist:  When Imperatives Collide:  Handicap Bathrooms 
(NPR radio broadcast Jan. 22, 2006), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ 
story.php?storyId=5167453. 
60 A caller to The Ethicist indicated that she would ordinarily never “use the handi-
capped stall,” and would instead “wait for one of the regular stalls,” but on one occa-
sion she was in a big hurry, the “regular” restroom was overcrowded, and she didn’t see 
“any handicapped people or any families,” so she used the “handicapped-slash-family 
restroom” in the hall.  Id.  Cohen then draws a contrast to parking spaces, which driv-
ers leave for a long or unknown amount of time, and which are legally designated as 
exclusively for the use of people with disabilities.  Id.  With a bathroom stall, “no one is 
explicitly forbidden to use it,” and “even if you are a person that uses a wheelchair, you 
can often wait a moment or two.”  He therefore concludes that “if you actually see a 
handicapped person, then you should defer to them” because “you’ve got multiple 
stalls or multiple restrooms, but they’ve just got one,” but “unless you actually see 
someone in a wheelchair waiting to use it,” then you can use any stall.  Id.  Interest-
ingly, in a follow-up program, the one letter they chose to read considered the subject 
too trivial to be an ethical dilemma:  “I know you were being humorous with your dis-
cussion of the use of the family bathroom and public restrooms as urgent, but 
shouldn’t The Ethicist be addressing much more ethically urgent issues?”  All Things 
Considered:  Letters:  Job Safety, Washroom Ethics (NPR radio broadcast Feb. 4, 2006) (relat-
ing a letter from Joan Mittendorf), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ 
story.php?storyId=5189915. 
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ability who wanted to use an accessible stall first,61 people do not al-
ways behave in a principled manner, and not all relevant disabilities 
are visible.  Moreover, once a nondisabled person is in the stall, it is 
then temporarily unavailable to disabled users.  The Article will return 
to the question of tradeoffs,62 but the important point here is that the 
example of accessible toilets shows that the social meaning given to 
the accommodation—or the rules that dictate how it is used—can de-
termine whether it has costs or benefits to third parties.  Accessible 
toilets therefore belong on the spectrum somewhere between disabled 
parking spaces, which are convenient spots that third parties are le-
gally prohibited from using, and curb cuts, which everyone can use. 
The design of accommodations—not only the rules about their 
use—can affect whether accommodations have third-party benefits or 
costs.  Turning to the workplace, we can see this through the example 
of accommodations for impairments that limit lifting.  An employer 
faced with a request for accommodation from an employee whose 
back pain prevents her from lifting heavy objects has several options,63 
as depicted in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4:  The Design of Workplace Accommodations 
 
More Costs  More Benefits 
Redistribute heavy Limited-use Redesign workplace 
lifting to coworkers equipment to minimize lifting for all 
 
On the left (costs) side of our spectrum, an employer could redistrib-
ute all the heavy lifting to coworkers.  This is likely reasonable if heavy 
lifting is a marginal, rather than an essential, function of the job, and 
the redistribution does not create an undue hardship by preventing 
 
61 This norm was, for instance, agreed upon both by the questioner and by Cohen 
in the episode of The Ethicist referred to above.  See supra notes 59-60. 
62  See infra Part III.C. 
63 For cases discussing some of these options, see, for example, Mays v. Principi, 
301 F.3d 866, 868 (7th Cir. 2002) (accommodating a nurse’s back injury by reassigning 
her to positions (first the temporary position of light-duty nurse and then to a clerical 
position) where no heavy lifting is required); Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 
141 (3d Cir. 1998) (discussing a nurse’s request for light-duty work to accommodate a 
cartilage tear in her wrist); Penny v. UPS, 128 F.3d 408, 410 (6th Cir. 1997) (involving 
a UPS employee who requested, as accommodations for back and shoulder injuries, a 
shorter route with fewer boxes to deliver, a truck with power steering, and “rollers and 
‘two wheelers,’” described as “aids” to help “handle heavy packages”). 
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coworkers from performing the essential functions of their jobs.64  Be-
cause coworkers would have additional burdens, this accommodation 
presumably creates third-party costs. 
On the right (benefits) side of the spectrum, an employer could 
instead purchase equipment and redesign stock rooms so that no em-
ployees have to lift heavy objects.  For certain jobs, movable shelves 
and automated trolleys could replace employee lifting, or at least shift 
all lifting to the less straining waist-height level.  Ergonomic design of 
workplace keyboards and other facilities has a similar effect.65  Reduc-
ing physical strain for all employees creates physical third-party bene-
fits.  These benefits may also be internalized by employers through 
reduced injuries and workers’ compensation costs.66  Because the ac-
commodations are both durable and generalizable, their benefits 
could be substantial.67
Somewhere in the middle of the spectrum, the employer could 
purchase a limited amount of assistive equipment that could be used 
by the disabled employee as needed, and used by others when that 
employee is not present or does not need it.  The equipment could at 
least prevent third-party costs, because it would eliminate the need for 
coworkers to take on extra lifting.  In addition, the rules concerning the 
distribution of this equipment would dictate the extent to which it bene-
fits third parties.  Thus, where the accommodation falls on the spectrum 
of third-party costs to benefits depends, in part, upon its design. 
This point about the design of accommodations also further high-
lights a distinction between types of accommodations that benefit third 
parties.  That is the distinction, mentioned briefly above, between those 
accommodations that are universally designed (nonrivalrous) and those 
that are zero-sum or somehow limited in supply (rivalrous).  The redes-
igned stock room is an example of Universal Design, whereas lifting 
equipment can be used by only one person at a time and thus is limited 
in supply.  Where feasible, Universal Design can be expected to benefit 
64 See supra note 182 and accompanying text (discussing relevant agency guidance 
on third-party costs and undue hardship).  Compare Deane, 142 F.3d at 147-48 (conclud-
ing that lifting is not an essential function of a nurse’s job), with Mays, 301 F.3d at 869, 
871 (concluding that lifting more than ten pounds is an essential function of a nurse’s 
job, and noting, in dicta, that being able to lift more than ten pounds is probably not a 
major life activity). 
65 See supra note 22 (discussing how ergonomics not only accommodates individu-
als with disabilities, but also helps prevent primary and secondary injuries). 
66 See supra note 28 (quoting relevant findings by Schartz, Hendricks & Blanck). 
67 See supra Part I.A (discussing the terms generalizability and durability). 
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more people than zero-sum accommodations.68  But even apparently 
zero-sum accommodations can benefit third parties.  As discussed, their 
use can be allocated to give priority to employees with disabilities, while 
also permitting other users to benefit when the accommodations are 
not being used by those who require them.  One interesting question 
that deserves empirical study is whether instances of reverse integra-
tion—such as including nondisabled people in contexts principally 
populated by people with disabilities, or allowing nondisabled people 
some limited access to the scarce resources of unusually beneficial dis-
ability accommodations (such as touching art in museums)—could 
counteract any of the stigma of disability.69
This Part has discussed a few of the many ways accommodations 
can create benefits to third parties.  Surprisingly, as the next Part 
shows, courts and other entities have utterly failed to see, much less to 
account for, these benefits. 
II.  NEGLECTED BENEFITS 
[T]he word “reasonable” in the term “reasonable accommodations” . . . 
[means that an employer] would not be required to expend enormous sums in 
order to bring about a trivial improvement in the life of a disabled employee. 
Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Department of Administration70
 
68 See supra note 38 and accompanying text (explaining Universal Design); see also 
Mace, supra note 38 (“Universal design broadly defines the user. . . . Its focus is not 
specifically on people with disabilities, but all people.” (emphasis omitted)). 
69 Indeed, permitting or inviting nondisabled people to use apparently zero-sum 
accommodations in a limited way might even create cachet or desire in place of stigma.  
Exclusive or limited access to something can make people want to join it; one might 
think here of exclusive clubs or roped-off VIP sections.  Ruth Colker, in criticizing 
Kelman and Lester for assuming that separate classrooms for disabled students must 
be stigmatizing, tells a story that might suggest some of the kinds of accommodations 
that could create these effects.  She describes a special education classroom called the 
“Teddy Bear” room, which a few nondisabled students were routinely invited to join, 
and which the select nondisabled students volunteered to join, presumably because of its 
name and atmosphere.  Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All:  A Disability Perspec-
tive, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1415, 1462 n.264 (2007) (discussing MARK KELMAN & 
GILLIAN LESTER, JUMPING THE QUEUE:  AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF 
STUDENTS WITH LEARNING DISABILITIES (1997)).  Colker, however, does not see the 
“Teddy Bear” room as having positive effects on attitudes toward disability since the 
students were unaware that the room had anything to do with disability.  Id. at 1463 
n.264.  But if the disability connection were known, then perhaps something like the 
“Teddy Bear” room (i.e., with its intensive resources and appealing connotations) 
could help to create positive attitudes toward disability. 
70 44 F.3d 538, 542-43 (7th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added). 
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One of the oft-stated aims of the ADA is to remedy “benign ne-
glect.”71  Judge Calabresi draws upon this idea in the classic accom-
modation case of Borkowski v. Valley Central School District :  “To avoid 
unfounded reliance on uninformed assumptions,” Calabresi observes, 
judges cannot simply “rely on intuition” about what are essential func-
tions of a job or (un)reasonable accommodations.72  Whether disabil-
ity discrimination consists principally of benign neglect, animus, stereo-
typing, or something else, is a contested point.  For my purposes, the 
phrase benign neglect gestures toward a different point altogether. 
What the ADA does not remedy—and indeed may even aggra-
vate—is the problem of neglected benefits.  By this I mean that courts 
and agencies frequently fail to notice the benefits of disability accom-
modation—beyond those to the individual for whom they were de-
signed.  Accommodations can have many and varied benefits to third 
parties, as the previous Part illustrated, and yet those entities that 
oversee the implementation of the ADA neglect to include such bene-
fits in their analyses.  This Part identifies some contexts in which these 
benefits are neglected and considers reasons for this neglect. 
A.  Overlooking the Benefits 
The ADA requires employers to make “reasonable accommoda-
tions” for employees with disabilities, unless those accommodations 
“would impose an undue hardship” on the employer.73  As this Part will 
71 See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 (1985) (“Discrimination against 
the handicapped was perceived by Congress to be most often the product, not of in-
vidious animus, but rather of thoughtlessness and indifference—of benign neglect.”). 
72 63 F.3d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 1995). 
73 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000).  The employment title of the ADA prohibits 
“discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disabil-
ity of such individual.”  Id. § 12112(a).  The definition of disability under the statute is 
as follows: 
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of 
the major life activities of such individual; 
(B) a record of such an impairment; or 
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment. 
Id. § 12102(2).  To fail to accommodate a disability is to “discriminate,” under the fifth 
prong of the statutory definition of that term: 
[T]he term “discriminate” includes . . . not making reasonable accommoda-
tions to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified in-
dividual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered 
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show, although key court decisions have interpreted “reasonable[ness]” 
and “undue hardship” in terms of costs and benefits, these decisions—
as well as important agency documents and resources—have over-
looked the third-party benefits of accommodations in striking ways. 
Accommodations are not nearly as costly as one might expect.  
Work by Peter Blanck, Helen Schartz, and others indicates that most 
accommodations cost little or nothing.74  In addition, though employers 
may expect accommodations to be costly,75 follow-up interviews have re-
vealed that, in hindsight, employers often thought that the benefits of 
accommodations exceeded their costs.76  (And of course many employ-
ees with disabilities do not require accommodation at all.77) 
Nonetheless, courts and other entities frequently characterize ac-
commodations as costly to employers (and sometimes to coworkers) 
and beneficial only to the disabled employee for whom they are de-
signed.78
entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue 
hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity . . . . 
Id. § 12112(b), (b)(5)(A). 
74 Blanck’s early work on accommodations at Sears from 1978 to 1997 indicated 
that most accommodations (72%) cost nothing, and that average accommodation 
costs ranged from $45 to $121.  Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the Employment Pro-
visions of the Americans with Disabilities Act:  Part I—Workplace Accommodations, 46 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 877, 902 & n.122 (1997).  As Michael Stein notes, these results probably did not 
adequately reflect the potential costs of all accommodations, since they do not include 
“soft” costs, nor do they include the costs of accommodations that were not granted 
(which may have been especially costly).  Stein, supra note 6, at 108-09.  More recently, 
Blanck, Helen Schartz, and D.J. Hendricks have done further work interviewing the 
varied employers who contact JAN to seek advice about accommodations.  They have 
found that the employers deem nearly half (49.4%) of the accommodations to have no 
direct costs, and employers estimate that most (74.1%) cost less than $500 in the first 
year.  Schartz, Hendricks & Blanck, supra note 26, at 348. 
75 See, e.g., Kevin Schartz et al., Employment of Persons with Disabilities in Information 
Technology Jobs:  A Literature Review for “IT Works,” 20 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 637, 645 (2002) 
(reporting on studies suggesting that employer concerns about the cost of accommo-
dations are a barrier to employment for disabled people). 
76 See Schartz, Hendricks & Blanck, supra note 26, at 350.  The authors report that, 
for those employers for whom net calendar-year effect could be calculated, the mean 
benefit was $11,335 and the median $1000.  The net effect was positive for more than 
half of this group (59.8%); a wash for just over one-fifth (21.8%); and negative for just 
under one-fifth (18.4%).  The authors do not report whether these results are signifi-
cant.  Id. 
77 See id. at 348 (“In almost half of the cases . . . employers reported that there was 
zero direct cost associated with the accommodation.”). 
78 See infra notes 80-112 and accompanying text (discussing key cases).  Seth Harris 
has rightly noted the emphasis on costs in Barnett, before going on to show the poten-
tial first- and second-party benefits of accommodating in that case.  See Harris, supra 
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(1) Courts.  What makes an accommodation “reasonable” and not 
an “undue hardship” is murky business.  The courts have given some 
content to these terms, almost entirely overlooking third-party bene-
fits in the process. 
Key circuit-court cases provide the foundation for the legal pa-
rameters of the accommodation requirement by proposing some kind 
of comparison of costs and benefits.  But they do not specify which 
benefits matter to the analysis of whether a particular accommodation 
is required.  In so doing, they entirely disregard the possibility of 
benefits to nondisabled others and largely overlook the possibility 
even of benefits to other disabled individuals.79
The opinion in the foundational accommodation case Vande 
Zande v. Wisconsin Department of Administration80 slips between discuss-
ing the benefits of accommodation as if they accrue to just one indi-
note 13, at 178-79 (observing that in Barnett Justice Breyer neglects to discuss “the costs 
of failing to accommodate” Barnett, such as the benefits to the employer as well as Bar-
nett of accommodation (emphasis added)).  Harris further notes that 
reading Barnett’s silence to suggest that the benefits of an accommodation are 
not relevant would amount to treating Robert Barnett and, by extension, all 
workers with disabilities as costs to be avoided rather than economic contribu-
tors to be valued.  The desire to change this stereotype was an important mo-
tivation when Congress enacted the ADA. 
Id.  As Harris points out, broader benefits were imagined by the statute’s supporters in 
Congress: 
The ADA is a major step in the elimination of the barriers that limit full par-
ticipation. 
 Indeed, elimination of barriers is not always without cost to businesses.  
But, it is a cost that I believe that should be incurred, considering the benefit 
to those with disabilities, the benefit to business, and the benefit to our entire 
society. 
135 CONG. REC. S11,718 (1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin), quoted in Harris, supra 
note 13, at 178.  Michael Stein and Peter Blanck also discuss forms of third-party bene-
fits that will not be completely internalized by employers.  See supra notes 13-16, 28. 
79 I know of only one case that explicitly incorporates third-party benefits into its 
reasoning; it is not an employment case, but a schools case, in which the court noted 
that an accommodation of sensitivity training could have benefits to other disabled stu-
dents.  Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1402 (9th Cir. 
1994).  Even that case made no mention of the possibility that an accommodation 
could benefit nondisabled others. 
80 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995).  For a thoughtful discussion of the Vande Zande 
opinion and the numerous ways in which it fails to compare costs and benefits ade-
quately, see Cass Sunstein’s contribution to the Special Issue Commemorating Twenty-
Five Years of Judge Richard A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis Without Analyzing Costs or 
Benefits:  Reasonable Accommodation, Balancing, and Stigmatic Harms, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1895 (2007). 
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vidual, and discussing benefits as if they could redound to multiple 
disabled people.  Vande Zande was a program assistant to the state’s 
housing division, a job involving mostly clerical duties.81  She was para-
lyzed from the waist down, causing her to suffer pressure ulcers that 
sometimes required her to stay at home for several-week periods.82  
The state had provided several accommodations, including supplying 
backup so she could leave for medical appointments, paying to have 
the bathrooms modified so she could use them, and buying adjustable 
furniture for her.83  The two disputed accommodation issues in the 
case were the employer’s failure to permit her to telecommute and to 
provide computer equipment to enable her to do so, and the em-
ployer’s refusal, while the office building was still under construction, 
to alter the design of the kitchenette on her floor to install the 
counter two inches lower than planned (at a cost of $150) so that she 
could use it rather than using the bathroom sink for activities such as 
washing out her coffee cup.84  In an opinion by Judge Posner, the Sev-
enth Circuit concluded that a telecommuting accommodation was per 
se unreasonable because it interfered with teamwork and direct supervi-
sion, and that the harm involved in using the different sink was merely 
stigmatic and therefore too insignificant to warrant mandatory accom-
modation.85
The opinion is best known for its role in defining two key terms 
associated with the ADA’s accommodation requirement:  “reasonable” 
(as in “reasonable accommodations”86) and “undue hardship” (as in 
the employer defense that a requested accommodation is not re-
quired if it would impose an “undue hardship” on the employer87).  
Neither the statute nor the regulations define reasonableness; the 
question for the court was whether “reasonable” simply meant “effec-
tive,” or whether it imposed an independent limitation on the kinds of 
accommodations that were required.88  Posner concluded that the 
81 Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 544. 
82 Id. at 543. 
83 Id. at 544. 
84 Id. at 544-46. 
85 Id. at 545-46. 
86 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000) (defining “discriminate” to mean “not 
making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an 
otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee”). 
87 See id. § 12111(10)(A) (“The term ‘undue hardship’ means an action requiring 
significant difficulty or expense, when considered in light of [several enumerated fac-
tors].”). 
88 Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 542. 
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term would be superfluous if it meant only “effective,”89 an interpreta-
tion the Supreme Court subsequently endorsed.90  Though he 
thought quantifying costs and benefits would not always be necessary, 
and the cost “slightly” exceeding the benefit did not make an accom-
modation unreasonable, he said, “at the very least, the cost could not 
be disproportionate to the benefit.”91
For undue hardship, the statute provides a definition—“an action 
requiring significant difficulty or expense”92—but, unsurprisingly, of-
fers incomplete guidance on its application.93  Posner noted that the 
“financial condition of the employer is only one consideration” under 
the statute, and thus concluded that “undue” must be interpreted to 
mean that the expense is undue in relation to the resulting benefit, as 
well as to the employer’s resources.94
Thus, Posner essentially read some degree of cost-benefit balanc-
ing into both terms.  He combined the two in a burden-shifting for-
mulation: 
So it seems that costs enter at two points in the analysis of claims to an 
accommodation for a disability.  The employee must show that the ac-
commodation is reasonable in the sense that it is both efficacious and 
proportional to costs.  Even if this prima facie showing is made, the em-
ployer has an opportunity to prove that upon more careful consideration 
the costs are excessive in relation either to the benefits of the accommo-
dation or to the employer’s financial survival or health.
95
Posner’s emphasis is thus on the costs—which “enter at two points in the 
analysis of claims to an accommodation.”96
Reading the opinion with benefits in mind, however, exposes a 
striking oversight in Posner’s explanations of reasonableness and un-
due hardship.  He typically speaks in terms of balancing the costs to 
the employer against the benefits only to the individual disabled em-
ployee.  For example, when speaking about the proportionality re-
quirement of reasonableness, he says that an employer “would not be 
89 Id. 
90 See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 399-402 (2002) (rejecting the ar-
gument that “reasonable” simply means “effective”). 
91 Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 542. 
92 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A). 
93 See infra Part IV.C (discussing the relevance of third-party benefits to the undue-
hardship analysis). 
94 Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 543 (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B)(ii)–(iii)). 
95 Id. 
96 Id. (emphasis added). 
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required to expend enormous sums in order to bring about a trivial 
improvement in the life of a disabled employee.”97  And when he first 
introduces the topic of undue hardship, he also speaks in terms of a 
single employee benefiting from accommodation:  “We must ask, ‘un-
due’ in relation to what?  Presumably . . . in relation to the benefits of 
the accommodation to the disabled worker as well as to the employer’s 
resources.”98  But elsewhere in the opinion, he speaks as if benefits 
might accrue to many disabled employees:  “[T]he function of the 
‘undue hardship’ safe harbor . . . is to excuse compliance by a firm 
that is financially distressed, even though the cost of the accommoda-
tion to the firm might be less than the benefit to disabled employees.”99
This slippage between one disabled employee and multiple dis-
abled employees shows an ambiguity surrounding—and a marked in-
attention to the issue of—whether to count the benefits of an accom-
modation that accrue to other disabled people in the workplace. 
Moreover, Posner wholly neglects the possibility of any benefits to 
nondisabled employees; he simply does not mention them.  Perhaps it 
should not surprise us that he fails to consider the possibility of bene-
fits to third parties outside the workplace, since such benefits would 
generally be expressive (in order to reach those outside the work-
place), and, as noted, the opinion declares expressive harms to be in-
significant.100  But it is striking that he fails to notice the possibility of 
benefits to third parties inside the workplace (i.e., to coworkers). 
In the other foundational circuit-court case defining reasonable 
accommodation, Borkowski v. Valley Central School District,101 Judge 
Calabresi also fails to address whether third-party benefits matter.  
97 Id. at 542-43 (emphasis added).  The full context for this passage is as follows: 
It would not follow that the costs and benefits of altering a workplace to en-
able a disabled person to work would always have to be quantified, or even 
that an accommodation would have to be deemed unreasonable if the cost 
exceeded the benefit however slightly.  But, at the very least, the cost could 
not be disproportionate to the benefit.  Even if an employer is so large or 
wealthy—or, like the principal defendant in this case, is a state, which can 
raise taxes in order to finance any accommodations that it must make to dis-
abled employees—that it may not be able to plead “undue hardship,” it would 
not be required to expend enormous sums in order to bring about a trivial 
improvement in the life of a disabled employee. 
Id. at 542-43. 
98 Id. at 543 (emphasis added). 
99 Id. (emphasis added). 
100 Id. at 546. 
101 63 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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Borkowski involved an elementary-school library teacher who was de-
nied tenure because she had difficulties maintaining classroom disci-
pline.102  As a result of neurological damage sustained during an 
automobile accident, Borkowski had trouble with multiple stimuli due 
to concentration and memory problems.103  Her proposed accommo-
dation was a teacher’s aide to help with classroom discipline.104  The 
Second Circuit held that such an accommodation was not necessarily 
unreasonable.105
Calabresi’s opinion shows a more nuanced attention to benefits 
than Posner’s.  For one thing, Calabresi pauses to note the obvious 
point that benefits to the disabled employee who requested the ac-
commodation (first-party benefits), and not just benefits to the em-
ployer (second-party benefits), are relevant to the cost-benefit analy-
sis.106  That is, he emphasizes that accommodations do not need to be 
cost-justified from the employer’s perspective. 
In addition, at one point in the opinion, Calabresi seems implic-
itly to acknowledge the possibility of benefits to multiple individuals.  
In describing undue hardship as a “relational” term, like reasonable 
accommodation, Calabresi explains that undue hardship “looks not 
merely to the costs that the employer is asked to assume, but also to 
the benefits to others that will result,”107 perhaps implying that more 
than one employee could benefit from an accommodation, and thus 
suggesting that benefits to others could matter to the analysis of rea-
sonableness or undue hardship.108
102 Id. at 134. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 140. 
105 Id. at 141. 
106 See id. at 138 n.3 (“In evaluating the costs and benefits of a proposed accom-
modation, it must be noted that Section 504 does not require that the employer receive 
a benefit commensurate with the cost of the accommodation.”). 
107 Id. at 139 (emphasis added). 
108 Judge Newman, in his concurrence, also speaks in terms of “many disabled per-
sons” benefiting from accommodation, but read in context he does not seem to be ad-
dressing the possibility of a single accommodation benefiting more than one employee.  
Newman interprets Posner’s position in Vande Zande as saying that “an accommodation is 
not reasonable, even if would it enable many disabled persons to become employed, if the 
aggregate cost of making it at numerous installations exceeds the costs that would result 
if these disabled persons were not employed.”  Id. at 146 (Newman, J., concurring) (em-
phasis added).  Here, Newman is speaking about Posner’s comment that the statute aims 
to save public money by reducing welfare dependency (and interpreting it incorrectly, I 
think, though not without basis); his reference to “many disabled persons” might seem to 
suggest the possibility of an accommodation helping more than one person, but his 
phrase “numerous installations” perhaps qualifies that, suggesting that he means only 
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But like Vande Zande, Borkowski does not actually take third-party 
benefits into account when analyzing reasonableness or undue hard-
ship.  Nor do cases in other circuits that follow their reasoning.109  
Calabresi’s oversight in this regard may be most surprising, given his 
more careful discussion of types of benefits.  It is especially notable, 
then, that he does not engage the issue of which (or whose) benefits 
matter. 
Nor, however, do Vande Zande or Borkowski discuss third-party 
costs.  It might therefore seem that the neglect of third-party benefits 
is merely because such benefits concern third parties rather than first 
or second parties.  But two features of the neglect of benefits make it 
more noteworthy than the omission of third-party costs.  First, Posner 
does not merely fail to include third-party benefits in his analysis; 
rather, he is so impervious or indifferent to the possibility of third-
party benefits that he slips between, at times, treating the benefits side 
of the balance as including only first-party benefits and, at other times, 
treating it as including both first- and third-party benefits.  Second, 
even though both Posner and Calabresi sometimes seem to recognize 
implicitly the possibility of benefits to both first and third parties—
where third parties are other disabled people—neither judge ac-
knowledges possible benefits to nondisabled people.  This is a differ-
ent kind of oversight than merely not mentioning third-party costs.  
Both Posner and Calabresi, having already ventured into third-party 
terrain on the benefits side, nonetheless failed to see the possible 
benefits beyond the population of disabled people. 
Moreover, since Vande Zande and Borkowski, the Supreme Court 
has spoken directly to the issue of third-party costs—determining that 
they can be relevant to the reasonableness of an accommodation—
without any acknowledgement of the possibility of third-party benefits.  
In US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, the Court concluded that an accommo-
dation that would upset settled seniority interests is presumptively un-
reasonable.110  The Court was concerned that an employer may not 
that the same accommodation could be implemented multiple times, each time for a dif-
ferent disabled employee, by different employers. 
109 See, e.g., Walton v. Mental Health Ass’n of Se. Pa., 168 F.3d 661, 670 (3d Cir. 
1999) (quoting Borkowski, 63 F.3d at 139, for the proposition that “[o]n the issue of 
reasonable accommodation, the plaintiff bears only the burden of identifying an ac-
commodation, the costs of which, facially, do not clearly exceed its benefits”); Stewart 
v. Happy Herman’s Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1285-86 (11th Cir. 1997) (cit-
ing Vande Zande for the point that an employee is not entitled to any accommodation, 
but is limited to a reasonable accommodation). 
110 535 U.S. 391, 403 (2002). 
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always internalize costs to coworkers, and therefore thought that the 
reasonableness requirement must take them into account: 
[A] demand for an effective accommodation could prove unreasonable 
because of its impact, not on business operations, but on fellow employ-
ees—say, because it will lead to dismissals, relocations, or modification of 
employee benefits to which an employer, looking at the matter from the 
perspective of the business itself, may be relatively indifferent.
111
The Court reached this conclusion without even acknowledging the 
possibility that an accommodation could have second-party benefits, 
as Seth Harris has noted, or that it could have third-party benefits, for 
disabled or nondisabled others.112
(2) Other entities.  Perhaps even more surprisingly, the EEOC, in 
its Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation (the Guidance), 
discusses third-party costs while neglecting to mention third-party 
benefits.  The Guidance addresses the questions of whether negative 
effects on coworker morale can constitute an undue hardship (no) 
and whether negative effects on coworker productivity can constitute 
an undue hardship (possibly, if the negative effects are substantial 
enough to interfere with the coworkers’ ability to perform their jobs).  
Yet third-party benefits are nowhere to be seen.113
Other guides for employers about accommodation, whether pub-
lished by governmental or nongovernmental entities, similarly fail to 
point out the potential benefits to anyone other than the individual 
worker with a disability requesting the accommodation.114  Even the 
EEOC’s memo on telecommuting, which begins with broad language 
about how employers are discovering the benefits of telecommuting, 
says nothing in its main text about anyone other than the one em-
111 Id. at 400-01. 
112 See supra note 78 (discussing Harris’s commentary on Barnett). 
113 See EEOC, EEOC NOTICE NO. 915.002, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE:  REASONABLE 
ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES 
ACT (2002) [hereinafter EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON REASONABLE ACCOM-
MODATION], available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommodation.html; see 
also infra notes 120, 182, and accompanying text (discussing the EEOC’s Enforcement 
Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation). 
114 See, e.g., EEOC, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT:  A PRIMER FOR SMALL 
BUSINESSES (2004), http://www.eeoc.gov/ada/adahandbook.html#reasonable; EEOC, 
SMALL EMPLOYERS AND REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION (1999), http://www.eeoc.gov/ 
facts/accommodation.html; EEOC, YOUR RESPONSIBILITIES AS AN EMPLOYER (2005), 
http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/ada17.html; JAN, EMPLOYERS’ PRACTICAL GUIDE TO REA-
SONABLE ACCOMMODATION UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (n.d.), 
http://www.jan.wvu.edu/Erguide/Erguide.pdf; JAN, Accommodation Toolbox, http:// 
www.jan.wvu.edu/links/#Tool (last visited Feb. 15, 2008). 
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ployee requesting accommodation.115  Any exceptions highlight the 
possible benefits to employers alone.116  Nothing that I have found 
recognizes that certain accommodations have third-party benefits that 
are not benefits to employers.  Nor do these resources mention that 
accommodations may be designed to have more or fewer third-party 
benefits. 
B.  Why Benefits Are Not Salient 
Posner emphasizes that “costs enter at two points” while neglect-
ing the many points at which benefits might enter.  Various legal and 
nonlegal conversations about the ADA replicate this move.  This Sec-
tion briefly speculates on possible reasons—legal, political, and cul-
tural—that costs overshadow benefits in discussions of the ADA. 
(1) Legal.  The structure of the ADA may make costs salient in two 
ways:  by expressly requiring accommodation, and by asymmetrically 
protecting part, but not all, of the population. 
First, only the ADA imposes on employers an express obligation to 
“accommodate” and, through the regulations, requires them to dis-
cuss such accommodations with employees.  Since its passage, the 
ADA has been the subject of a debate over whether it is different from 
other antidiscrimination legislation—in particular, Title VII’s protec-
tion of race and sex.117  Both sides in this debate have missed an im-
115 See EEOC, WORK AT HOME/TELEWORK AS A REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION 
(2005), http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/telework.html. 
116 For instance, the webpage of the Office of Disability Employment Policy (which 
is part of the Department of Labor) emphasizes benefits to employers and contains a 
link to a piece making the “business case” for hiring people with disabilities.  See Office 
of Disability Employment Policy, Employer:  Building a Competitive Edge, 
http://www.dol.gov/odep/categories/employer/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2008).  Even a 
recent publication by the EEOC that looks like it might consider third-party benefits—
a fact sheet on reasonable accommodation for attorneys with disabilities—fails to 
achieve this promise.  See EEOC, REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS FOR ATTORNEYS WITH 
DISABILITIES (2006), http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/accommodations-attorneys.html.  This 
source advocates “thinking ahead” about “major changes in the work environment that 
affect all employees but may have a particular impact on attorneys with disabilities.”  Id.  
But then it proceeds to talk only about accommodations’ costs and how to avoid them.  
Id.  The section’s focus on costs is aptly captured by its title, “Thinking Ahead Can 
Avoid Future Problems.”  Id. 
117 For examples of those who argue that the ADA is different because it goes be-
yond the antidiscrimination requirement of Title VII to mandate a distinctive form of 
affirmative action, see Samuel Issacharoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination with a Differ-
ence:  Can Employment Discrimination Law Accommodate the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 
79 N.C. L. REV. 307 (2001); Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 13; Mark Kelman, Market 
Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 833 (2001); S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, 
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portant point about the social meaning of the statute.  Whether or not 
the ADA actually imposes distinct substantive obligations on employ-
ers, only the ADA explicitly requires employers to “accommodate” a 
class of employees. 
Unlike Title VII, the ADA defines discrimination in terms of ac-
commodation:  “[T]he term ‘discriminate’ includes . . . not making 
reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limita-
tions of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . .”118  
Naming the accommodation requirement is not a superficial differ-
ence.  The fact that the ADA names this category of obligations “ac-
commodations,” and expressly requires them as part of the definition 
of the duty not to discriminate, makes the ADA appear different from 
other statutes.  (While Title VII’s protection of religion also includes a 
duty to accommodate, that duty was folded into the definition of “re-
ligion,” rather than into “discriminate,” and has been interpreted nar-
rowly.119)  And only the ADA’s regulations require employers and em-
Something Borrowed, Something Blue:  Why Disability Law Claims Are Different, 33 CONN. L. 
REV. 603, 627-28 (2001); Amy L. Wax, Disability, Reciprocity, and “Real Efficiency”:  A Uni-
fied Approach, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1421 (2003).  For the contrary argument that 
antidiscrimination requirements under Title VII, like ADA accommodation, require 
employers to absorb many costs unrelated to any obviously illegitimate action on the 
employer’s part (including costs of not catering to discriminatory customer or co-
worker preferences, of banning rational stereotyping, and of changing rules that dis-
parately impact protected groups), see Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” 
Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825 (2003); 
Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642 (2001); and 
Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference:  ADA Accommodations as Antidis-
crimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579 (2004). 
118 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000); cf. infra note 119 (comparing the accom-
modation requirement for religion under Title VII with accommodations under the 
ADA).  The ADA’s duty to accommodate was lifted from the EEOC’s regulations im-
plementing the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C., 
which applied only to federal agencies and contractors.  See 29 C.F.R. § 32.13 (2007); S. 
REP. NO. 101-116, at 31 (1989). 
119 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e( j) (2000) (“The term ‘religion’ includes all aspects of 
religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates 
that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective em-
ployee’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of 
the employer’s business.”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 40 (1989) (distin-
guishing the “significant” duty to accommodate under the ADA from the lesser duty 
for religion under Title VII as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Trans World Air-
lines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), to extend only to those accommodations that 
impose no more than a de minimis cost on the employer); Karlan & Rutherglen, supra 
note 13, at 6-7 (commenting on the different treatment of “accommodation” in Title 
VII and the ADA); Malloy, supra note 117, at 627-28 (noting that Congress intended for 
accommodation to have a broader meaning in the ADA than in Title VII).  One could 
certainly analyze the third-party effects of accommodations in the religion context in in-
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ployees to engage in an “interactive process” to determine whether 
and what accommodations are appropriate.120  Disability law thus ap-
pears to flip the assimilationist demand on its head.  That is, instead of 
demanding that employees assimilate,121 disability law seems to require 
the environment, rather than the individual, to change.  Of course, all 
antidiscrimination statutes change the work environment, but the fact 
that the ADA requires such changes more explicitly than Title VII is 
likely to make the costs of the ADA more obvious. 
Because of the explicit accommodation requirement, the ADA is 
likely to be understood as imposing different obligations on employ-
ers from those imposed by other antidiscrimination statutes.  The na-
ture and extent of this perception is, of course, an empirical question, 
one that has not been studied directly.  There are data, however, sug-
gesting that, to the extent that the ADA has had disemployment ef-
fects, those effects have clustered in the states for which the statute’s 
teresting ways, and part of the narrowness of the accommodation requirement in this 
context is due to the greater solicitude of courts toward complaints of third-party costs.  
See generally 1 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 333-48 (2006). 
120 The regulations state the need for the interactive process permissively:  “To de-
termine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary for the [em-
ployer] to initiate an informal, interactive process with the qualified individual with a 
disability in need of the accommodation.”  29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2007).  The 
EEOC’s Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation is more adamant:  “The ap-
propriate reasonable accommodation is best determined through a flexible, interactive 
process that involves both the employer and the qualified individual with a disability.”  
Id. § 1630.9 app.; EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION, 
supra note 113. 
121 Cf. Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection:  The Visibility Presump-
tion and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 108 YALE L.J. 485 (1998); Kenji Yoshino, Cover-
ing, 111 YALE L.J. 769 (2002) [hereinafter Yoshino, Covering].  Yoshino in fact argues 
that the assimilationist demand persists in the disability context, asserting that the stat-
ute also requires people with disabilities to mitigate their disability as a prerequisite of 
obtaining coverage and accommodation under the statute.  KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING 
175 (2006).  This overlaps with the argument, made by Jill Hasday, that Sutton’s hold-
ing that employees should be considered in their post-mitigation state to determine if 
they are ADA disabled, implies that employees must mitigate in order to be protected 
under the statute.  See Jill Elaine Hasday, Mitigation and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
103 MICH. L. REV. 217, 230-34 (2004).  This is a contested claim about the statute, as 
Hasday appreciates, and one with which I disagree, for reasons too lengthy to set out 
here.  Note, though, that even if mitigation were required of those with the capacity to 
mitigate, this would not change the fact that the statute still requires accommodation 
by the workplace where mitigation is not possible or has already been completed.  That 
said, my claim is not that the ADA makes no assimilation demands—it surely does—but 
only that the ADA seems different from Title VII in how it allocates the pressure to 
change. 
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accommodation requirement was new.122  That is, in states where the 
accommodation requirement, but not antidiscrimination protection, 
for disability was new, employers hired fewer people with disabilities 
after the passage of the ADA—apparently suggesting that fear of hav-
ing to pay for accommodations animated any disemployment ef-
fects.123  This suggests that the perception of accommodation, at least 
at the time of enactment, was one of cost.  Even more notably, the dis-
employment effects appear to be temporary,124 suggesting that em-
ployers overestimated the costs—or, perhaps, underestimated the 
benefits—that accommodations would create.125  To make this point is 
not to resolve the question of whether the ADA is in fact more costly, 
or imposes greater demands on workplaces, than other antidiscrimi-
nation statutes.  But it does highlight a meaningful difference in cate-
gorization and terminology that may have implications for how the 
statute is understood. 
Second, the costs of the ADA may be more salient than the costs 
of Title VII because of the ADA’s asymmetrical structure.  The ADA 
protects only a subgroup of the population—those who are disabled—
rather than protecting everyone along an axis of his or her identity (as 
Title VII does for race or sex) or even protecting the most able and 
the least able.126  (On the latter, note that one could not bring a claim 
122 See Christine Jolls & J. J. Prescott, Disaggregating Employment Protection:  The Case 
of Disability Discrimination 18 (Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 106, 2005), avail-
able at http://ssrn.com/abstract=580741. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 20-21. 
125 Jolls and Prescott suggest that the difference between the short-term and long-
term effects may be due to any of the following:  the fact that “many accommodations, 
including physical alterations to the workplace and modification of workplace policies, 
impose obvious but often one-time costs on employers—costs that may well have been 
exaggerated or particularly salient in employers’ minds just after the ADA’s passage”; 
the fact that part of the short-term effects were in the period between enactment and 
the effective date, so declining to hire people with disabilities because of accommoda-
tion costs would not yet have been illegal; enforcement after the effective date; possi-
ble changes in attitudes over time in response to the statute’s symbolic effect; in-
creased investment in educational qualifications by individuals with disabilities; and 
declining costs of accommodations due to technological innovations and legal refine-
ments.  Id. at 21-22.  In light of the discussion herein, we might add to this list a realiza-
tion of unanticipated benefits. 
126 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000) (defining the protected class under the 
ADA as those who have “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits 
one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an im-
pairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment”), with id. § 2000e-
2(a)(1) (prohibiting, under Title VII, the discharge of “any individual” because of 
“such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”), and McDonald v. 
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under the ADA for being denied a job because of being “overquali-
fied” or too able.)  This asymmetrical structure has various interesting 
implications,127 but for purposes of this discussion, the asymmetry is 
important because it limits the group of people who are likely to see 
themselves as benefiting from the statute.  That is, only people who 
consider themselves to have disabilities are likely to see this statute as 
having been enacted for them.  For everyone else, the statute is either 
irrelevant or a potential cost to them, as employers or as coworkers to 
whom costs may be shifted.128
Relatedly, this statutory structure shapes the parties and argu-
ments that arise in litigation.  Title VII cases can be brought by men 
and whites, who therefore appear before courts as plaintiffs seeking 
the benefits they feel are their due under the statute and articulating 
those benefits to the courts.129  In contrast, the only people coming to 
court under the ADA are people who consider themselves to have (or 
to have a record of having or to be regarded as having) disabilities.130  
Courts may, and often do, disagree about a plaintiff’s disability status, 
leading to the many grants of summary judgment on the basis that the 
plaintiff is not impaired enough.131  But the point is that the argu-
ments in court are made exclusively by plaintiffs from one part of the 
Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 286-87 (1976) (holding that Title VII protects 
“white persons”). 
127 For a discussion of some of these implications, see Elizabeth F. Emens, The 
Sympathetic Discriminator:  Mental Illness, Hedonic Costs, and the ADA, 94 GEO. L.J. 399, 
464-65 (2006). 
128 Of course, nondisabled people could in theory see the statute as a potential 
benefit to them if they ever became disabled, creating a feeling of what we might call 
“existential insurance”—a kind of counterforce to what Harlan Hahn calls the “exis-
tential anxiety” that disabled people can inspire in nondisabled people.  See Harlan 
Hahn, The Politics of Physical Differences:  Disability and Discrimination, 44 J. SOC. ISSUES 
39, 43-44 (1988) (defining “existential anxiety” for nondisabled people as “the per-
ceived threat that a disability could interfere with the functional capacities deemed 
necessary to the pursuit of a satisfactory life,” a feeling resulting from “a sense of per-
sonal identification with the position of a disabled person”).  But the number of peo-
ple who are likely to make such a prediction about themselves is questionable; and re-
gardless, the effect on a nondisabled person of seeing the statute as really a benefit to 
herself is still likely to be different than if she had the present-day ability to bring a 
claim under it. 
129 See, e.g., McDonald, 427 U.S. at 286-87 (holding that Title VII protects white 
persons). 
130 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).  The record-of and regarded-as prongs broaden the pro-
tected group and help to soften the statute’s asymmetrical structure without funda-
mentally altering it. 
131 See infra note 229. 
EMENS_FINAL_REVISED II.DOC 4/7/2008  10:51:56 AM 
2008] INTEGRATING ACCOMMODATION 881 
 
population.  This frames the courts’ consideration of these issues in 
terms of the statute’s benefits to only a subset of the population. 
(2) Political.  Both employers and employees have political reasons 
not to raise the issue of third-party benefits.  Most obviously, employ-
ers may not always see these benefits,132 and they have nothing to gain, 
at least in the litigation context, from mentioning that accommoda-
tions have additional benefits.133  If an employer wishes not to provide 
an accommodation, her interest is, of course, in highlighting costs, 
not benefits.134
Less obviously, disabled people and disability advocates may also 
have reasons not to highlight third-party benefits.  Disabled individu-
als and advocates may be more likely than others to see disabled bod-
ies as extraordinary rather than flawed,135 and thus may best be able to 
perceive that the environmental changes required by those bodies can 
be beneficial, rather than costly, to others.  But those who advocate 
for disabled people may be inclined to focus on individual rights, and 
thus to argue that individuals with disabilities should be provided with 
accommodations as a matter of right.  This focus may lead advocates 
not to acknowledge or emphasize second- and third-party benefits.  
Moreover, for reasons discussed later, advocates might be concerned 
that any attention to third-party benefits could, through a kind of doc-
trinal drift, become a limiting principle on accommodations required 
by the ADA.136  These concerns about undue attention to third-party 
benefits are the focus of Part V. 
(3) Cultural.  Finally, broader ideas about disability might make 
costs more visible than benefits.  A prevailing assumption about dis-
ability is that it means loss or lack.  Indeed, the etymology of “disabil-
ity” suggests that something is missing that needs to be made up for, 
132 Seth Harris’s empirical work on EEOC mediation suggests that mediation is a 
more difficult task in ADA disputes, which he attributes in part to employers’ resis-
tance to accommodations as potentially costly.  Seth D. Harris, Disabilities Accommoda-
tions, Transaction Costs, and Mediation:  Evidence from the EEOC’s Mediation Program (N.Y. 
Law Sch. Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 06/07-5, 2007), available at http:// 
www.ssrn.com/abstract=920110, 12 HARV NEGOT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008). 
133 This is particularly true of third-party benefits that can be internalized by the 
employer (i.e., second-party benefits), explained earlier.  See supra notes 13-14. 
134 In addition, as discussed in relation to disclosure in Part IV.B, an employer may 
have an incentive not to credit the ADA for improvements to workplace life for third 
parties. 
135 See generally ROSEMARIE GARLAND THOMSON, EXTRAORDINARY BODIES (1997). 
136 See supra Part V.B. 
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filled in, supplied.137  Disability is thus often understood as something 
lesser that requires the distribution of resources toward it to compen-
sate.138  For this reason, disability may be generally associated with im-
posing costs on some for the benefit of individual others. 
Disability studies has challenged this idea and instead urged the 
adoption of a social model of disability.  The traditional understand-
ing of disability—the so-called medical model—views disability as a 
medical problem requiring a medical solution.  By contrast, the social 
model says that someone is disabled by the interaction between her 
body (or mind) and the disabling environment that is built for one 
kind of body (or mind) rather than another.  By contrast, the social 
model says that someone is disabled by the interaction between her 
body (or mind) and the disabling environment that is built for one 
kind of body (or mind) rather than another.  To introduce the distinc-
tion between the models, the writer Simi Linton, who uses a wheel-
chair, asks her students, “If I want to go to vote or use the library, and 
these places are inaccessible, do I need a doctor or a lawyer?”139
Few disability scholars or activists embrace a pure social model.  
Most recognize that not all disability is culturally constructed, but that 
culture still creates much of the disability associated with what we con-
sider impairments.  This middle-ground position recognizes that there 
can be pain or difficulty associated with disability, and that sometimes 
disability does require more resources or more support than other 
states of being, but still emphasizes that much of what makes disability 
disabling is the way the world is currently constructed. 
Despite the efforts by advocates and scholars to promote the social 
model, the medical model arguably prevails in the broader culture, as 
does the sense that a disability is a lack that requires costly filling.  It 
seems plausible that this understanding of disability primes courts, 
commentators, and others to see the accommodations made for dis-
ability as beneficial to those for whom they are designed, and costly 
for others, particularly for those others who are not disabled. 
137 As a prefix, “dis” denotes “the lack or absence” of the thing that follows it.  3 THE 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, at 391 (2d prtg. 1961). 
138 Though disability is particularly associated with lack, note that there are other 
legal contexts in which costs, but not benefits, are salient, as part of our legal culture’s 
tendency to focus on remedying harms more than recognizing benefits.  Cf. Douglas 
G. Lichtman, Irreparable Benefits 16 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., John M. Olin Law & Econ. 
Working Paper No. 305, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=928907. 
139 LINTON, supra note 42, at 120. 
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III.  INTEGRATING ACCOMMODATION 
[A]ccessible areas [must] not [be] restricted to use by people with disabilities. 
DOJ Regulations on Title III of the ADA
140
 
Should third-party benefits matter to the choice or design of ac-
commodations?  A simple social-welfare calculus suggests that they 
should.  As between two equally effective accommodations or accom-
modation designs, it seems sensible to choose the one that creates 
more benefits, rather than more costs, for third parties.  But the ADA 
is not a statute aimed at promoting everyone’s welfare; it is not the 
Americans Act.141  It is a statute that outlaws discrimination against in-
dividuals with disabilities.  Nonetheless, as this Part explains, an atten-
tion to third-party benefits, including nondisabled third parties, is 
consistent with the ADA. 
A key purpose of the ADA is to integrate people with disabilities 
into the workplace and the broader community.142  Though the stat-
ute’s findings set out several areas of concern, the aim of replacing 
exclusion with full participation features prominently and perva-
sively.143  Thus, while nothing in Title I of the statute requires attend-
140 ADA Standards for Accessible Design, 28 C.F.R. ch. 1, pt. 36, app. A, § 5.4 (1994); 
see infra note 144 (quoting the passage in full). 
141 I thank Adam Samaha for this turn of phrase.  Concerns that attending to 
third-party benefits will shift the focus of the statute away from disabled people are dis-
cussed directly in Part V. 
142 See, e.g., Mark C. Weber, Home and Community-Based Services, Olmstead, and Posi-
tive Rights:  A Preliminary Discussion, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 269, 278-79 (2004) (de-
scribing integration as the central “promise” of the ADA); David Strauss, Disability Dis-
crimination (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); cf. Jacobus tenBroek, The 
Right To Live in the World:  The Disabled in the Law of Torts, 54 CAL. L. REV. 841, 843-47 
(1966) (claiming that integration should be the goal of policymaking in this area).  But 
cf. Colker, supra note 69, at 1419-23 (arguing that the integrative purpose is sometimes 
given too much deference, particularly in the education context, to the detriment of 
the goal of antisubordination). 
143 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (2000) (“[H]istorically, society has tended to isolate 
and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms 
of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and per-
vasive social problem . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. § 12101(a)(5) (“[I]ndividuals with 
disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination, including outright 
intentional exclusion, the discriminatory effects of architectural, transportation, and communi-
cation barriers, overprotective rules and policies, failure to make modifications to existing facilities 
and practices, exclusionary qualification standards and criteria, segregation, and relegation to 
lesser services, programs, activities, benefits, jobs, or other opportunities . . . .” (em-
phasis added)); id. § 12101(a)(7) (“[I]ndividuals with disabilities [have faced restric-
tions, limitations, and other forms of discrimination], based on characteristics that are 
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ing to third-party benefits, it is consistent with the statute’s inclusion-
ary aims to try to integrate accommodations, as well as the individuals 
they accommodate, in ways that create third-party benefits.  Designing 
accommodations in this way has the potential to improve attitudes to-
ward disability and toward the ADA, and thus to further these integra-
tive goals. 
A.  Desegregating Accommodation 
What would it mean to have segregated accommodations?  The 
DOJ’s regulations for the implementation of Title III, the public ac-
commodations title, explain that restaurants should make all parts of a 
restaurant accessible.  If that is not feasible, however, then the “acces-
sible areas [must] not [be] restricted to use by people with disabili-
ties.”144  As the ADA Guide for Small Businesses explains:  “It is illegal to 
segregate people with disabilities in one area by designating it as an 
accessible area to be used only by people with disabilities.”145
beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not 
truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute 
to, society . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. § 12101(a)(8) (“[T]he Nation’s proper goals 
regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full partici-
pation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals . . . .” 
(emphasis added)).  On the multiple goals of the statute more generally, see Emens, 
supra note 127, at 481-82. 
144 28 C.F.R. ch. 1, pt. 36, app. A, § 5.4 (1994).  The relevant passage reads: 
5.4 Dining Areas.  In new construction, all dining areas, including raised or 
sunken dining areas, loggias, and outdoor seating areas, shall be accessible.  
In non-elevator buildings, an accessible means of vertical access to the mezza-
nine is not required under the following conditions:  1) the area of the mez-
zanine seating measures no more than 33 percent of the area of the total ac-
cessible seating area; 2) the same services and decor are provided in an 
accessible space usable by the general public; and, 3) the accessible areas are 
not restricted to use by people with disabilities.  In alterations, accessibility to 
raised or sunken dining areas, or to all parts of outdoor seating areas is not 
required provided that the same services and decor are provided in an acces-
sible space usable by the general public and are not restricted to use by people 
with disabilities. 
Id. 
145 OFFICE OF ENTREPRENEURIAL DEV., U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., ADA GUIDE FOR 
SMALL BUSINESSES 13 (1999), available at http://www.sba.gov/ada/smbusgd.pdf.  The 
full context for this quote is as follows: 
If it is not readily achievable to provide the minimal number of accessible ta-
bles in all areas where fixed tables are provided, then the services must be 
provided in another accessible location, if doing so is readily achievable.  
However, these alternate location(s) must be available for all customers and 
not just people with disabilities.  It is illegal to segregate people with disabili-
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Why are “segregated” accommodations illegal?  Most obviously, a 
separate seating section for people with disabilities isolates people 
with disabilities.  Indeed, it smacks of the kind of segregation—
separate lunch counters, separate water fountains—characteristic of 
race relations in the Jim Crow South.  The problem is not with segre-
gating the accommodations, but with segregating the individuals who 
use them. 
But Title III’s prohibition of segregated accommodations also 
points us toward another idea:  integrating not only people with dis-
abilities, but also disability accommodations, can change the culture 
in ways that are consistent with the inclusionary purposes of the ADA.  
In particular, designing accommodations with an eye to their benefits 
for third parties may help improve attitudes toward disability and the 
ADA.  These attitudinal benefits may arise through three routes:  (1) 
improved “contact,” (2) positive associations, and (3) increased up-
take of the social model. 
(1) Improved contact.  To work and live using overlapping tools 
and facilities may promote an additional kind of working together.  Cyn-
thia Estlund has characterized the workplace as the contemporary site 
of adult integration—the place where we meet and become tolerant 
of diverse others.146  This raises the question of what role accommoda-
tions play in that integrative endeavor.  Accommodations surely assist 
with integration to the extent that they enable people with disabilities 
to participate in workplace communities,147 but the design of accom-
modations could affect the form that participation takes.  Put starkly, a 
special sink or special bathroom could be akin to the segregation Title 
III prohibits in the restaurant.  (The plaintiff’s expressive-harm claim 
in Vande Zande might be read in this light.148)  Separate stalls may work 
ties in one area by designating it as an accessible area to be used only by peo-
ple with disabilities. 
Id. 
146 CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER:  HOW WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN 
A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY (2003). 
147 See infra notes 151-152 (citing literature showing the positive effects of “contact” 
between disabled and nondisabled persons). 
148 The Seventh Circuit rejected the relevance of these expressive considerations.  
The relevant passage in Judge Posner’s opinion is this: 
Her argument rather is that forcing her to use the bathroom sink for activities 
(such as washing out her coffee cup) for which the other employees could use 
the kitchenette sink stigmatized her as different and inferior; she seeks an 
award of compensatory damages for the resulting emotional distress.  We may 
assume without having to decide that emotional as well as physical barriers to 
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like separate drinking fountains, to reinforce the stigmatic divide be-
tween groups.  Perhaps separate equipment or rules could operate 
similarly.  The extent to which stigmatic attitudes are shaped by sepa-
rate facilities or tools in the disability context is an empirical question 
that no current research answers directly. 
Research in management studies indicates, however, that “co-
worker attitudes have a profound impact on the employment experi-
ences of people with disabilities.”149  Further work suggests that co-
the integration of disabled persons into the workforce are relevant in deter-
mining the reasonableness of an accommodation.  But we do not think an 
employer has a duty to expend even modest amounts of money to bring about 
an absolute identity in working conditions between disabled and nondisabled 
workers.  The creation of such a duty would be the inevitable consequence of 
deeming a failure to achieve identical conditions “stigmatizing.”  That is 
merely an epithet. 
Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 546 (7th Cir. 1995).  The plaintiff’s 
claim might be read to rest principally on the fact that the sink she was to use for food 
and drink purposes was in the bathroom, which might seem problematic because the 
bathroom is less sanitary or salubrious than the kitchen.  But her claim as described in 
the district court further emphasizes the separateness as independently problematic:  
“Plaintiff argues that the failure to make the entire kitchen accessible violates the ADA 
because forcing her to use the bathroom sink amounts to a ‘separate but equal’ facility 
that cannot rise to [the] level of a reasonable accommodation and violates the ADA’s 
prohibition against classifying or segregating disabled employees in a manner that 
would ‘affect’ their ‘employment opportunities or status.’”  Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t 
of Admin., 851 F. Supp. 353, 362 (W.D. Wis. 1994) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.5 (1994)).  
Title I defines “discriminate” to include “limiting, segregating, or classifying a job ap-
plicant or employee in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or status of such 
applicant or employee because of the disability of such applicant or employee.”  42 
U.S.C. § 12112(b). 
149 Lisa Schur et al., Corporate Culture and the Employment of Persons with Disabilities, 
23 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 1, 3-20 (2005) (citing Adrienne Colella, Organizational Socialization 
of Newcomers with Disabilities:  A Framework for Future Research, 14 RES. PERSONNEL & HU-
MAN RESOURCES MGMT. 351 (1996) and Dianna L. Stone & Adrienne Colella, A Model 
of Factors Affecting the Treatment of Disabled Individuals in Organizations, 21 ACAD. MGMT. 
REV. 352 (1996)); see Peter David Blanck & Mollie Weighner Marti, Attitudes, Behavior 
and the Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 VILL. L. REV. 345 
(1997); Adrienne Colella, Coworker Distributive Fairness Judgments of the Workplace Accom-
modation of Employees with Disabilities, 26 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 100 (2001); Adrienne 
Colella et al., The Impact of Ratee’s Disability on Performance Judgments and Choice as Part-
ner:  The Role of Disability—Job Fit Stereotypes and Interdependence of Rewards, 83 J. APPLIED 
PSYCHOL. 102 (1998); see also DAVID M. ENGEL & FRANK W. MUNGER, RIGHTS OF INCLU-
SION:  LAW AND IDENTITY IN THE LIFE STORIES OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES 244-45 
(2003) (observing, in a qualitative study of employees with disabilities and the ADA, 
that most were not inclined to assert their rights directly, but, rather, “depended al-
most exclusively on rights becoming active in some other way—through the support of 
coworkers, through the unilateral actions of their supervisors, through corporate deci-
sions to alter workplace environments or practices, or through more diffuse attitudinal 
changes or cultural and discursive shifts”). 
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worker attitudes will be affected, inter alia, by whether coworkers ex-
pect that the presence of people with disabilities will make their own 
jobs harder or less desirable.150
Moreover, research indicates that nondisabled people’s attitudes 
toward disability can be improved through contact with people with 
disabilities.151  And the contact literature generally suggests that those 
ameliorative effects are limited to certain kinds of contact—notably, 
contact between individuals of equal status working cooperatively and 
not just superficially.152  Working together using the same tools, 
equipment, or rules—some of which have been provided by virtue of 
the person with a disability—could have greater destigmatizing effects 
than working with separate equipment or having one person’s ac-
commodation be the other person’s burden. 
(2) Positive associations.  Relatedly, if attitudes toward coworkers 
with disabilities can be affected by whether accommodations increase 
the burdens on coworkers,153 then merely knowing that improved 
working conditions are due to a coworker’s disability could improve 
attitudes toward disability or the ADA.  As discussed in Part I, accom-
modations can create benefits for coworkers or customers that in-
150 See Stone & Colella, supra note 149, at 372, 380-81 (1996). 
151 See, e.g., Patrick W. Corrigan & David L. Penn, Lessons from Social Psychology on 
Discrediting Psychiatric Stigma, 54 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 765, 772-73 (1999); Donna M. Des-
forges et al., Effects of Structured Cooperative Contact on Changing Negative Attitudes Toward 
Stigmatized Social Groups, 60 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 531 (1991); Monika E. Ko-
lodziej & Blair T. Johnson, Interpersonal Contact and Acceptance of Persons with Psychiatric 
Disorders:  A Research Synthesis, 64 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1387 (1996); 
Elaine Makas, Positive Attitudes Toward Disabled People:  Disabled and Nondisabled Persons’ 
Perspectives, 44 J. SOC. ISSUES 49 (1988); Stone & Colella, supra note 149, at 383; see also 
Emens, supra note 127, at 445 n.192, 481 n.344 (citing sources).  For a recent large-
scale demonstration of the benefits of contact across studies and categories, see Tho-
mas F. Pettigrew & Linda R. Tropp, A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory, 90 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 751 (2006). 
152 See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 117, at 843-44 & n.55 (2003) (discussing how 
working together in “circumstances of relative equality can reduce prejudice and 
stereotyping”); Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together:  The Workplace, Civil Society, and the 
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1, 23-24 (2000) (summarizing research indicating that the “contact 
hypothesis” is best supported by situations of “cooperative interdependence” involving 
an “equality of status” and “normative support for friendly” interactions); Jerry Kang & 
Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures:  A Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative Action,” 94 
CAL. L. REV. 1063, 1101-02 (2006) (discussing the conditions that contribute to a debi-
asing environment, including the need for equal status, cooperation, and nonsuperfi-
cial contact); see also Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika:  Intergroup Rela-
tions After Affirmative Action, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1251, 1331 (1998) (stating that “simple 
integration” alone is not sufficient to reduce “intergroup conflict” and that competitive 
contact will actually worsen “intergroup bias”). 
153 See Stone & Colella, supra note 149, at 372. 
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crease productivity, improve health, increase happiness, or prompt 
experimentation.  Coworkers’ or customers’ associating these benefits 
with the presence of employees with disabilities could improve atti-
tudes toward disability even if these coworkers or customers have no 
direct “contact” with people with disabilities.  In addition, and more 
speculatively, perhaps permitting nondisabled coworkers limited ac-
cess to rivalrous accommodations could create affirmative cachet for 
those for whom the accommodations are designed.154  These sugges-
tions are, of course, only theories, albeit plausible ones, and they raise 
empirical questions that merit further study.  Such empirical work 
should investigate, among other questions, precisely how the benefits 
of accommodations become salient, and to what extent salient bene-
fits translate into favorable attitudes toward the person who requested 
the accommodation and that person’s group. 
(3) Uptake of the social model.  Accommodations that benefit 
third parties could also promote a conceptual shift that facilitates in-
tegration:  when accommodations designed for disabled people bene-
fit those who are not disabled, appreciation of that fact may alter the 
assumed structure of social distribution.  That is, if disability accom-
modations improve the work environment both for the nondisabled 
majority and for people with disabilities, then integrating people with 
disabilities cannot be understood as a kind of charitable gift from ma-
jority to minority.  Rather, the minority, as well as the majority, con-
tributes to the improvement of the shared environment.  This is true 
both in a material sense—that disability improves nondisabled peo-
ple’s environments—and in a rhetorical sense—that nondisabled 
people understand that disability has improved their environments. 
One approach to thinking about the conceptual potential of 
third-party benefits is to ask how people come to appreciate the social 
model of disability—the idea, discussed in Part II, that disability in-
heres in the interaction between impairment and the social world.155  
Saying that there is nothing natural or necessary about stairs, for ex-
ample, may persuade some people.  Or pointing out that the setup of 
a room makes it accessible to nondisabled people (through chairs and 
lights and other features) may help illuminate the social model for 
154 Cf. supra note 69 and accompanying text (distinguishing Universal-Design ac-
commodations from apparently zero-sum accommodations and discussing Ruth 
Colker’s story of the “Teddy Bear” room). 
155 See supra text accompanying note 139 (comparing the medical and social mod-
els of disability). 
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some.156  Or seeing a disabled coworker perform effectively because of 
an accommodation may help someone see how the world without the 
accommodation was structured to disadvantage that person.157
But to show that the world we inhabit is less than ideal for every-
one, not just for people with disabilities, seems like a particularly po-
tent way to denaturalize the current structure of our environment.  If 
people can see that the disability of some people prompts improve-
ments in the environment that benefit everyone, then they are hard 
pressed, I think, to claim that there is something natural and better 
about the status quo.  They may be more likely to consider the possi-
bility that the current way of doing things is not always best, not only 
because it excludes some people—disabled people—but also because 
this way of doing things has been disabling us all.158  We might think 
of this as the “radical social model.” 
Appreciating the radical social model leads to questioning the 
merits of many aspects of our current environment, with disability 
serving as the lens through which to gain insights into the ways in 
which our current environment can be improved.159  As discussed in 
Part I, disability may be a particularly helpful lens for these purposes 
because, while disabled people bear costs shared by many nondisabled 
people, for the former those costs rise to a level that they become dis-
156 Susan Daniels, a former Social Security Commissioner for Disability, was appar-
ently fond of pointing out that only those with disabilities bring their own chairs, and 
that lights, microphones, and loudspeakers are accommodations for people who get 
their sensory input that way.  See Adrienne Asch, Critical Race Theory, Feminism, and Dis-
ability:  Reflections on Social Justice and Personal Identity, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 391, 402 (2001) 
(citing Susan Daniels, Address at the Conference of the Association for Higher Educa-
tion and Disability ( July 14, 1999)). 
157 Or, alternatively, others may be persuaded by the point that being able to lift 
more than ten pounds is likely to be a major life activity in some contexts and milieus 
(e.g., in communities of laborers) and not in others (e.g., among judges and law pro-
fessors), making an impairment in lifting a disability in one world and not in the other.  
Cf. Mays v. Principi, 301 F.3d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting, in dicta, that “[w]e 
doubt whether lifting more than 10 pounds is [a major life] activity”). 
158 I agree with Adam Samaha that the social model—as a descriptive account of 
how disability is created—does not necessarily require any normative prescriptions.  See 
Adam M. Samaha, What Good Is the Social Model of Disability?, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1251, 
1253 (2007) (“The social model . . . has essentially nothing to say about which [norma-
tive] framework to use.”).  But the social model does, I believe, have real rhetorical 
and imaginative power to challenge assumptions about disability—and the radical so-
cial model possibly even more so.  For further discussion, see Elizabeth F. Emens, 
Against Nature, NOMOS (forthcoming 2008). 
159 Cf. LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY:  ENLISTING RACE, 
RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY (2002) (discussing race as a lens 
through which to identify broader societal problems). 
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abling and require solutions.160  This necessity may therefore inspire 
solutions that then diminish costs for others who have been absorbing 
those costs in a nondisabling way.  Once these broader ameliorating 
effects are recognized, then the social model becomes hard to deny, at 
least as a plausible theory worth considering with regard to any given 
aspect of the world. 
B.  The Example of Telecommuting 
The accommodation of telecommuting helps to illustrate the im-
plications of thinking about third-party benefits as promoting integra-
tive goals.  Telecommuting has not received a very favorable reception 
from courts as an ADA-required accommodation,161 but it has been 
embraced by a substantial number of employers162 and the EEOC,163 as 
well as by President Bush’s New Freedom Initiative (NFI).164  Employ-
160 See supra text accompanying note 53. 
161 See, e.g., Kvorjak v. Maine, 259 F.3d 48, 58 (1st Cir. 2001) (concluding that “the 
essential functions of a claims adjudicator cannot be performed at an individual em-
ployee’s home”); Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 544 (7th Cir. 
1995) (citing teamwork and supervision concerns as rationales for concluding that 
“[g]enerally . . . an employer is not required to accommodate a disability by allowing 
the disabled worker to work, by himself, without supervision, at home”); Misek-Falkoff 
v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 854 F. Supp. 215, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (citing the inability to 
train the plaintiff at home as a rationale for rejecting telecommuting as a “reasonable 
accommodation”), aff’d, 60 F.3d 811 (2d Cir. 1995); Kristen M. Ludgate, Note, Tele-
commuting and the Americans with Disabilities Act:  Is Working at Home a Reasonable Accom-
modation?, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1309, 1325-30 & nn. 104-34 (1997) (collecting and sum-
marizing cases that presume that telecommuting is not a “reasonable 
accommodation”).  But see, e.g., Langon v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 959 F.2d 
1053, 1061-62 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (acknowledging that not allowing an employee to work 
from home may constitute a failure to reasonably accommodate). 
162 See, e.g., Lori D. Bauer, Telecommuting Tradeoffs:  Freedom and the Law, BUS. L. 
TODAY, Mar.–Apr. 2002, at 17, 17 (“[N]ew capabilities have launched telecommuting 
as . . . an attractive option for both employers and employees . . . .”); Robert Ingle, Tele-
commuting:  “Taking Your Work Home with You” Will Never Be the Same Again, MD. B.J., 
Nov.–Dec. 2000, at 3, 4. 
163 See EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION, supra 
note 113 (indicating that, in some instances, telecommuting is a “reasonable accom-
modation” that employers must allow). 
164 Exec. Order No. 13,217, 66 Fed. Reg. 33,155 ( June 18, 2001).  President Bush’s 
New Freedom Initiative for People with Disabilities includes the Telework Program, 
which provides federal funds to twenty states to guarantee low-interest loans for people 
with disabilities to purchase computers and other equipment so that they may work 
from home.  See Press Release, Office of Press Sec’y, White House, President Bush 
Highlights Commitment to Americans with Disabilities ( June 19, 2001), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010620.html (announcing a 
$20 million budget for the Access to Telework Fund); see also RESNA NAT’L ASSISTIVE 
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ers have reportedly found that telecommuting reduces overhead costs, 
and benefits various types of employees, including those with family 
responsibilities and long commutes, in addition to those with certain 
disabilities.165
Revisiting our extended spectrum of accommodation design from 
Part I,166 we can see in Figure 5 that a telecommuting accommodation, 
like an accommodation for an impairment in lifting, can be designed 
in multiple ways.  A telecommuting accommodation might be de-
signed in a way that creates many costs for coworkers and few or no 
offsetting benefits.  If one worker is working from home, then em-
ployees who are on-site may need to locate materials and prepare 
faxes or mailings, in addition to taking over any parts of the distant 
worker’s job that require face time.167  If assuming such tasks makes it 
impossible for coworkers to perform the essential functions of their 
TECH. ASSISTANCE P’SHIP, INCREASING EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEOPLE WITH 
DISABILITIES:  A REPORT ON THE FIRST TWO YEARS OF PROGRAM OPERATIONS OF THE 
TELEWORK PROGRAM FY 2004–FY 2005, at 1-2 & tbl.A (2006).  Combined federal and 
state funds for the Telework Program total $21.9 million (with states providing one for 
every nine dollars of federal funds).  Id.  As of 2005, however, only 78 applications had 
been submitted, mostly from entrepreneurs, at a value of $349,535.  U.S. DEP’T OF 
EDUC., ACCESS TO TELEWORK FUND, at G-50 (2001), available at http://www.ed.gov/ 
pubs/AnnualPlan2002/rV215-TeleworkFund-0412.pdf. 
165 See, e.g., Ludgate, supra note 161, at 1321-22 (“Benefits to employers include 
savings on office overhead, lower employee absenteeism, increased productivity, im-
proved employee morale, and higher employee retention.  Telecommuting also pro-
vides significant public policy benefits, including reduced traffic congestion, air pollu-
tion, and energy consumption.” (footnotes omitted)).  Note, as a caveat to the claim of 
third-party benefits, that Michelle Travis has made a compelling argument that tele-
commuting, like any other new workplace technology, may effectively benefit those 
with power and burden those without it, and may do so in a particularly gendered way.  
Specifically, Travis argues that women are more likely to be pushed into working from 
home, where their home responsibilities may overwhelm them further.  See Michelle A. 
Travis, Telecommuting:  The Escher Stairway of Work/Family Conflict, 55 ME. L. REV. 261, 
265 (2002). 
166 See Figure 4, supra Part I.F. 
167 See Kvorjak, 259 F.3d at 56 n.15 (“[T]he State maintains that such research 
would be difficult for an at-home employee to manage without imposing an undue 
burden on employees at the office because it requires physical access to paper files, as 
well as access to the unemployment insurance database.  An at-home employee thus 
would have to rely on others to find, copy, and mail needed documents.”); see also 
Timothy Golden, Co-Workers Who Telework and the Impact on Those in the Office:  Under-
standing the Implications of Virtual Work for Co-Worker Satisfaction and Turnover Intentions, 
60 HUM. REL. 1641, 1660 (2007) (commenting on the greater workload experienced 
by coworkers of telecommuters, in a study of 240 professional employees (of one or-
ganization) that found that a greater prevalence of teleworking was correlated with 
greater dissatisfaction with coworkers, but that this correlation was diminished for em-
ployees with greater job autonomy). 
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jobs, then an employer could claim an undue hardship.168  Otherwise, 
coworkers would merely need to absorb the additional work.  This sort 
of accommodation is best placed on the far left of the spectrum. 
In the middle of the spectrum, employers could purchase equip-
ment, such as laptops or fax machines, that could be used at home by 
any employee, though presumably with priority given to the worker 
with a disability.169
Finally, a telecommuting accommodation could be designed to pro-
vide many benefits and few costs to third parties.  For example, a work-
place could be redesigned to enable many employees to telecommute.  
Cost savings from reduced office space could perhaps be reinvested in 
portable equipment or in administrative staff to prepare mailings and 
otherwise support the at-home workers.  A variety of employees might 
prefer this arrangement, since it eliminates commuting time, and can 
create more flexible or more comfortable working conditions. 
 
Figure 5:  A Spectrum of Telecommuting Accommodations 
 
More Costs  More Benefits 
Redistribute office-based Limited-use Redesign workplace so many 
tasks to coworkers equipment can telecommute 
 
How does telecommuting look from an integrationist perspective?  
Under the standard integration story, telecommuting seems far from 
ideal.  Rather than creating contact by bringing people together—to 
work side by side, to get to know each other, and to eliminate stereo-
types and animus—telecommuting seems to isolate the disabled em-
ployee at home.  Certainly, an employer’s requiring a disabled em-
ployee to work from home because of coworker animus would 
constitute problematic segregation.170  But an accommodation that 
 
168 See infra note 182 and accompanying text. 
169 President Bush’s NFI Telework Program could help support the purchase of 
such equipment, though it provides little incentive for employers, as opposed to em-
ployees or entrepreneurs, to apply for the loans, because employers who apply must do 
so in the name of a particular employee who retains legal title to the equipment.  Let-
ter from Joya Banerjee to author (Oct. 4, 2006) (on file with the University of Pennsyl-
vania Law Review) (reporting on a conversation with Nancy Meidenbauer of the Reha-
bilitation Engineering & Assistive Technology Society of North America (RESNA) 
Technical Assistance Project). 
170 Cf. Duda v. Bd. of Educ., 133 F.3d 1054, 1056, 1059-60 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding 
that the employer violated the ADA because it “segregated [Duda] from others at the 
school” by forcing him to transfer to another site). 
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permits a worker with a disability to work from home might seem less 
than ideal even when requested by the employee.  We might think 
that it is normatively acceptable only as a last resort, when other, in-
office accommodations are inadequate to permit that employee to 
work, or when virtual communication is standard in the workplace 
such that contact continues remotely.171
From the perspective of integrating accommodations discussed 
here, however, telecommuting perhaps looks more appealing—that is, 
if the telecommuting accommodation is designed in the high-benefits 
version on the right side of the spectrum.  If an office redesign or pol-
icy change in favor of telecommuting for many is prompted by an ac-
commodation request from an employee with a disability, then co-
workers who are also happily working from home may develop more 
favorable attitudes toward disability or may begin to see the virtues of 
the social model of disability, as discussed above.  The accommoda-
tion thus brings about a sort of integration by indirection. 
As this example suggests, the inclusionary benefits I am emphasiz-
ing depend largely on coworker knowledge that the beneficial change 
in the environment results from the person with a disability.  This in-
vites some important observations about disclosure and publicity, 
which are the subject of the next Part.  First, though, we turn to some 
difficult questions about tradeoffs and the meaning of disability and 
accommodation. 
C.  Tradeoffs and Definitions:  The Meaning of 
Disability and Accommodation 
Looking at accommodation through the lens of third-party bene-
fits helps to deepen the concepts of accommodation and of disability.  
Third-party benefits help us see that the idea of accommodation actu-
ally encompasses two distinct models, which work together to effect 
both narrow and broad changes to the environment.  This conceptual 
point can be usefully explained by responding to a series of questions, 
both practical and definitional, that arise out of this analysis: 
• Doesn’t an attention to third-party benefits create a fur-
ther set of problems involving tradeoffs between bene-
fits to third parties and benefits to disabled employees?  
How do we balance these competing interests? 
171 On the latter, see, for example, Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 
1186-1205 (2000). 
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• Does viewing accommodation from the perspective of 
third-party benefits affect our understanding of the 
definition of disability? 
• Is an accommodation still properly termed an “accom-
modation” once it is integrated into the environment 
and redounds to the benefits of the many rather than 
the few? 
These three questions are interrelated, and my answers to them begin 
with an observation about the meaning of accommodation. 
The final question highlights the fact that we can understand ac-
commodation in two distinct ways, which are somewhat in tension.  
The static model of accommodation understands accommodation as a 
special thing done for one or a few individuals, for a subset of the 
population, to make it possible for those different individuals to par-
ticipate in, for example, the workplace.  In contrast, the dynamic model 
of accommodation understands accommodation as a process of interro-
gating the existing baseline, by focusing on part of the population that 
was neglected in the creation of that baseline, to make changes to that 
baseline that may affect everyone.  Both ideas are encompassed by the 
term of accommodation, though they are in tension. 
The tension between these two models of accommodation relates 
to what Martha Minow calls “the dilemma of difference.”  She writes, 
“when does treating people differently emphasize their differences 
and stigmatize or hinder them on that basis? and when does treating 
people the same become insensitive to their difference and likely to 
stigmatize or hinder them on that basis?”172  Under the static model, 
difference is reified.  A small subset of the population is the target of 
an intervention, designed and implemented for those individuals’ 
benefit, because they are different.  Under the dynamic model, we risk 
ignoring difference.  Because the model treats disability as a lens 
through which to see the need for universal improvements, disabled 
people and their particular needs risk being lost in the mix.  The 
whole idea of accommodation risks dissolving into a general social 
welfare program in which disabled people’s needs matter no more 
and no less than anyone else’s. 
The tension between the two models of accommodation could 
seem a weakness or a flaw.  But recognizing the importance and con-
tours of third-party benefits allows us to see how the tension between 
the two models is, instead, a vital and productive part of accommoda-
172 MINOW, supra note 17, at 20. 
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tion, as answers to the three questions help demonstrate.  First, when 
dilemmas arise about which interests should matter more—the work-
place needs of the disabled employee or the third-party benefits to the 
nondisabled coworker—then the needs of the disabled employee 
should take priority.  This conclusion requires no new legislation or 
amendment.  It comports with the statute’s “individual” focus.173  Ac-
commodating particular individuals with disabilities to make work-
place participation possible is the aim of the statute.  This is the static 
model at work.  Yet, as this Article shows, introducing accommoda-
tions will sometimes involve a beneficial change in the workplace for 
everyone.  And careful attention to the design of accommodations in-
volves an inquiry into the value of existing baselines that may alter the 
workplace structure or practices for everyone:  the dynamic model. 
Relatedly, using these two models can help us understand why, as 
a practical and legal matter, a change that restructures the workplace 
in a way that benefits everyone, nondisabled as well as disabled, can 
still properly be called “an accommodation.”  The ADA remains in 
place, with no sunset provision, no expected time of obsolescence.  So 
a change that is needed by disabled employees, but that provides wide-
spread benefits, may fade into the background and no longer be rec-
ognized as an accommodation.  But if an employer wanted to with-
draw that change, the disabled employee’s legal entitlement to 
accommodation would reemerge as a stopgap to the elimination of 
that accommodation.  The accommodation could be replaced with 
another effective accommodation, but it could not simply be removed; 
its salience as an accommodation for disabled employees would come 
back into focus at this point. 
Finally, these two models show why the third-party benefits analy-
sis is significant to our social understanding of disability, although it 
should not change the legal definition.  Samuel Bagenstos has argued 
persuasively that the ADA has an antisubordination purpose, con-
cerned with the subset of the population subject to systematic “im-
pairment-based subordination.”174  While Bagenstos rightly observes 
that courts have gone too far in the direction of limiting the Act’s cov-
erage to a narrow category of the “truly disabled” on a medical model, 
he also properly concludes that the statute should not be extended to 
173 See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999). 
174 Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 
418, 418-67 (2000). 
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protect everyone along a universalizing axis of ability/disability.175  
This seems exactly right, and nothing in the third-party benefits analy-
sis suggests otherwise. 
But even though this Article’s analysis should not alter the legal 
definition of who is protected by the statute, it should affect our cultural 
conception of disability and the ADA.  As noted in Part II, the societal 
understanding of disability as lack, as something missing, leads to a 
view of the statute as a one-way redistribution.  The ADA, under this 
view, involves a kind of employer (and, to some extent, coworker) lar-
gesse.  Employers and coworkers expend their resources to help this 
different, and lesser, group participate.  In a sense, this is the static 
model.  The significance of third-party benefits comes, however, in the 
interplay between the static model and the dynamic model. 
Disability is what requires a change to the structural environment 
or the processes of the workplace, to ensure that an employee with a 
disability can participate (the static model).  But recognizing that 
these changes may bring about third-party benefits, automatically or 
through careful design, invites a process that interrogates the baseline 
and its potential improvement for many (the dynamic model).  The 
aim is not ultimately to untether these two versions of accommodation 
so that only the second persists.  On the contrary, disability is the nec-
essary lens through which we constantly interrogate the world as it is 
currently structured; as the world changes, so will disability, and thus 
the feedback loop between the static model and the dynamic model 
will continue.  That is, we must continue to come back to the static 
model, both because the statute’s individualized, antisubordination 
project requires it, and because the fact of disability is what continues 
to inspire the more broadly useful inquiry of the dynamic model. 
Once we see the vitality of this process, disability itself looks dif-
ferent.  No longer merely a site of public and private largesse, disabil-
ity is instead a crucial instigator of changes that can be more broadly 
beneficial.  The changes need not be a net gain to employers or to so-
ciety, though they sometimes will be.  What matters for a subtle shift 
in our conception of disability is only that we see that the gains are 
greater and broader than they are currently understood to be. 
Of course, hard questions and difficult tradeoffs remain.  For in-
stance, what should be done if the disabled employee’s preferred ac-
commodation—the one that allows him to do his job even better—has 
fewer third-party benefits than one that merely allows him to do his job 
175 Id. at 466-84. 
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effectively?  Under current interpretation, the decision about which to 
provide would be up to the employer.  I would hope the interactive 
process might result in constructive dialogue about the overall work-
place and the different interests at stake, and some mutually satisfying 
solution might be reached.  But that won’t always be the case, and I do 
not purport in this Article to answer the question of how such conflicts 
are best resolved.  This Article takes the step of identifying the fact that 
interests converge in ways that have gone unrecognized.  It shows how 
recognizing these convergences can lead to more such benefits through 
careful design and can help to shift our conception of disability and the 
ADA.  The next Part provides a framework for thinking about which 
changes matter to this project and for analyzing the legal and policy 
contexts in which this analysis can be applied. 
IV.  DESIGNING INTERVENTIONS TO INTEGRATE ACCOMMODATION 
This Article thus far has provided a set of tools for thinking about 
accommodation, both individually and structurally.  Because third-
party benefits have largely gone unnoticed, their role in the design 
and implementation of accommodations has not been analyzed.  Part 
I of this Article therefore provided a spectrum for comparing alterna-
tive accommodations in terms of their potential costs and benefits to 
third parties.  It showed how the design of an accommodation deter-
mines where it falls on this spectrum.  Part III explained how these 
third-party benefits are relevant to the integrative aims of the ADA.  It 
showed how attending to third-party benefits can help us effectively to 
use two models of accommodation in tandem:  the static model of ac-
commodation—with its attention to individual needs—and the dy-
namic model of accommodation—with its potential for questioning 
and altering the baseline to everyone’s benefit. 
I hope these ideas are of conceptual use to scholars.  But I also hope 
that they might be of conceptual, and even practical, use to employers 
and other institutional designers.  Any individual need for an accommo-
dation can be analyzed in terms of its location on the spectrum of third-
party costs and benefits, and alternative designs for an accommodation 
may be compared on the spectrum.  As the discussion of the two models 
of accommodations demonstrated, any such analysis must keep the dis-
abled individual’s need foremost in mind, even while that need prompts 
a broader inquiry into the status quo for the workplace more generally.  
As Part III also discussed, the primary reason that third-party benefits 
matter is that they may improve attitudes toward disability and the ADA.  
Thus, this analysis requires one further set of tools:  a framework for dis-
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tinguishing usage benefits and attitudinal benefits, and analyzing alter-
native accommodations in terms of their production of each.  The first 
Section of this Part provides that framework. 
The rest of this Part builds upon that distinction to propose a 
number of legal and policy changes.  Interventions that create attitu-
dinal benefits—by, for example, publicizing already existing third-party 
benefits—should typically be pursued.  The EEOC’s policy on disclo-
sure of accommodations should therefore be revised.  The EEOC’s 
guidance interprets statutory privacy provisions very narrowly to imply 
that employers may never disclose to coworkers the disability-related 
reason for a workplace accommodation, even with the employee’s 
consent and support.  This runs directly counter to the conclusion 
prompted by an understanding of third-party benefits:  disclosure and 
publicity, if properly conducted with employee consent, could im-
prove attitudes toward people with disabilities and the ADA by prop-
erly attributing any third-party usage benefits of accommodations to 
the statute and to the requesting employee.  The EEOC should there-
fore revise its guidance not only to permit disclosure where the em-
ployee consents, but also to advise employers on how to disclose in a 
manner that highlights third-party benefits, thus promoting favorable 
attitudes toward accommodation.  In addition, courts should begin to 
consider third-party benefits in their analyses of reasonableness and 
undue hardship, at least to the extent that they base these determina-
tions on a consideration of costs and benefits.  Moreover, agencies 
and other public entities that advise employers or provide information 
about the ADA should discuss third-party benefits and offer guidance 
on designing accommodations to enhance third-party benefits.  Fi-
nally, recognizing third-party benefits of accommodations should in-
spire more institutions to include disability in their diversity initiatives.  
This Part discusses each of these ideas, after first setting out a frame-
work for thinking about the implications of this analysis. 
A.  A Framework:  Usage Versus Attitudinal Benefits 
The third-party benefits discussed in this Article can be divided 
into two groups:  those that increase attitudinal benefits to third par-
ties and those that increase usage benefits to third parties.  As noted 
in Part I, attitudinal benefits are improvements in attitudes toward 
people with disabilities or the ADA.  Usage benefits are those benefits 
(e.g., material, physical, hedonic) that directly accrue to the third 
party who uses or is affected by the accommodation.  The distinction 
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between these types of benefits—and the means of creating attitudinal 
benefits in particular—requires further elaboration. 
Chart A categorizes different types of accommodations—or differ-
ent designs for the same accommodation—based on whether they 
create usage benefits or attitudinal benefits: 
 
Chart A:  Attitudinal Versus Usage Benefits to Third Parties 
 
 
Usage benefits  
to third parties 
No usage benefits  
to third parties 
Attitudinal 
benefits to  
third parties 
Box I 
Accommodations with usage 
benefits and attitudinal bene-
fits to third parties—i.e., ac-
commodations used by co-
workers that are known to be 
due to disability. 
 
Examples:  office redesign to 
reduce lifting strain; broad-
based telecommuting initia-
tive. 
Box II 
Accommodations with attitu-
dinal benefits, but no usage 
benefits—i.e., accommoda-
tions used only by the individ-
ual disabled worker but known 
about by coworkers. 
 
Example:  a typing stick for a 
quadriplegic employee, which 
coworkers can see but would 
not use. 
No attitudinal 
benefits to  
third parties 
Box III 
Accommodations with usage 
benefits to third parties, but 
no attitudinal benefits—i.e., 
accommodations used by co-
workers but not known to be 
due to disability. 
 
 
 
Examples:  those noted in Box 
I, but without coworkers 
knowing that disability is the 
source of the benefit. 
Box IV 
Accommodations with no us-
age benefits and no attitudinal 
benefits—i.e., accommoda-
tions not used beneficially by 
coworkers and either not 
known about or known about 
only in terms of their burden 
on coworkers. 
 
Examples:  ergonomic office 
furniture not known about or 
shared with any other worker; 
or heavy lifting redistributed 
to coworkers. 
 
Box I has been the principal emphasis of this Article:  situations in 
which an accommodation has third-party usage benefits that translate 
into attitudinal benefits, whether through improved contact, positive 
associations, or the radical social model.  Box II contains those accom-
modations that lack usage benefits for others—because the accommo-
dation will not be used by anyone else—but may still have attitudinal 
benefits.  For instance, seeing a disabled coworker enabled by an ac-
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commodation may help coworkers appreciate the social model of dis-
ability.176
By contrast to the accommodations in the first row, those in the 
second row have no attitudinal benefits.  Box III includes those ac-
commodations that have usage benefits to third parties—i.e., they im-
prove the work or lives of coworkers—but do not improve attitudes.  
The key examples of these accommodations are those that have usage 
benefits but are not disclosed (to coworkers) as having been 
prompted by disability or the ADA.  That is, they would seem to co-
workers just to be general workplace improvements, with no connec-
tion to disability. 
Those in Box IV have neither usage nor attitudinal benefits.  
These are harder to picture, at least in part because all accommoda-
tions permitting a disabled employee to remain in the job presumably 
have the potential for some attitudinal benefits—simply through “con-
tact.”  But bracketing those generalized relational benefits, we can see 
two main types of accommodations that would fall into Box IV:  first, 
those that have no usage benefits to third parties and are unknown to 
coworkers (such as ergonomic furniture or office design that no one 
else would use or notice), and second, those that are known to co-
workers but only through the burden they create (such as redistribut-
ing undesirable marginal tasks to coworkers). 
These distinctions help to identify two different types of inter-
ventions:  first, those that move accommodations upward into the top 
row by creating more attitudinal benefits (Chart B), and second, those 
that move them leftward by creating more usage benefits (Chart C). 
 
Chart B:  Creating More Attitudinal Benefits 
Through Disclosure and Publicity 
 
 
Usage benefits  
to third parties 
No usage benefits  
to third parties 
 
Attitudinal 
benefits to  
third parties 
Box I Box II 
No attitudinal 
benefits to  
third parties 
Box III Box IV 
 
 
176 See supra Part III. 
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Interventions to increase or improve disclosure and publicity sur-
rounding accommodations have the potential to increase attitudinal 
benefits.  Not everyone would agree, however, that publicizing ac-
commodations is a good idea.  There are legitimate concerns about 
employee privacy issues, discussed in the next Section.  In addition, 
Charles Riley has argued that accommodations should be as discreet 
as possible.  This is a surprising statement in a book focused on the 
benefits to employers of hiring and accommodating disabled people.  
Riley nonetheless writes, 
The paragon [of Universal Design] is not just a “barrier-free environ-
ment” but one that hides its accessibility features, making it more com-
fortable for both the person with a disability and the person without.  
For architects, this is license to make the building beautiful as well as 
functional . . . . Architecture that screams “accessibility” is for a hospital 
or nursing home, not the office. . . . Because it will be decades if ever be-
fore a wheelchair, hearing aid, or cane does not set off at least a mild sense 
of alarm in the minds of coworkers or customers, the corporate environ-
ment is better off concealing the ramp, literally and metaphorically.
177
Riley seems to view the stigma of disability as unavoidable.  And he 
seems therefore to think that accommodations can be aesthetically 
pleasing and fully integrated only if their association with disability is 
concealed or minimized.  But as we have learned from the gay rights 
movement, there is power in openness.  Perhaps coming out about 
accommodation can improve attitudes—both toward disabled people 
and toward accommodations.178  Moreover, coming out about accommo-
dation seems a particularly promising way to improve attitudes where 
the accommodations have positive effects on the workplace and co-
workers. 
Creating more attitudinal benefits (as in Chart B) thus seems the 
easiest form of intervention to embrace.  It maintains the focus on ac-
commodating people with disabilities, while raising awareness of exist-
177 RILEY, supra note 13, at 110-11. 
178 Riley seems to be talking about passing, to the extent that he wants the ac-
commodations to be concealed.  His reference to “screaming,” however, implies an 
interest in that milder sister of passing—covering.  Covering involves not concealing an 
identity, but making it possible for others to disattend that identity.  See generally Yo-
shino, Covering, supra note 121 (developing a theory of covering building on ERVING 
GOFFMAN, STIGMA:  NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 102-04 (1963)).  
What effect covering, or declining to cover, has on others’ attitudes would be an inter-
esting topic for empirical study.  But it seems reasonable to think that making others 
aware of positive changes to the environment due to disability would help encourage 
favorable attitudes toward disability.  See supra Part III. 
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ing third-party benefits, and thus improving attitudes toward both 
people with disabilities and the ADA.  Interventions aimed at upward 
movement are therefore less likely to raise the concerns discussed in 
Part V, about distracting attention from disabled people, because 
these interventions do not advocate redesigning accommodations to 
benefit third parties.  As noted earlier, the statute is called the 
“Americans with Disabilities Act,” not the “Americans Act,” and this 
Article does not aim to change that focus. 
That said, the existence of third-party usage benefits of accommo-
dations may also contribute to those attitudinal shifts—through im-
proved contact, positive associations, or the radical social model, as 
discussed in Part III.  And appealing or not, coalition building (i.e., 
interest convergence) may be necessary, as discussed in Part V.  Thus, 
designing accommodations to move them leftward on the chart (see 
Chart C) may also be useful to disabled people and to the ADA’s inte-
grative aims, at least where that leftward shift can be done without in-
terfering with the accommodations’ effectiveness for individual peo-
ple with disabilities. 
 
Chart C:  Creating More Usage Benefits Through 
Choice and Design of Accommodations 
 
 
Usage benefits  
to third parties 
No usage benefits  
to third parties 
Attitudinal 
benefits to  
third parties 
Box I Box II 
No attitudinal 
benefits to  
third parties 
Box III Box IV 
 
The next Section focuses principally on an intervention that seems 
most appealing for its emphasis on upward movement—toward more 
attitudinal benefits—through increased and improved disclosure of ac-
commodations within the workplace.  The other interventions discussed 
involve a combination of increasing usage and attitudinal benefits. 
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B.  Disclosure 
Integrating accommodations can improve attitudes toward disabil-
ity and the ADA only if coworkers know that disability prompted the 
positive changes to the workplace.  The EEOC’s policy on disclosing 
accommodations runs directly counter to this insight. 
The EEOC has interpreted the narrow medical-nondisclosure re-
quirement in the ADA as a broad prohibition on an employer’s dis-
closing any information about an employee’s disability or accommo-
dation.  The statutory language does not require such a conclusion.  
The relevant language prohibiting disclosure appears only in the 
clause on “[e]mployment entrance examination,” where the statute 
reads, “information obtained regarding the medical condition or his-
tory of the applicant is collected and maintained on separate forms 
and in separate medical files and is treated as a confidential medical 
record” subject to exceptions for those who need to know because 
they implement the accommodation, such as supervisors.179  The 
EEOC has interpreted this to suggest that employers may not disclose 
an employee’s disability or accommodation to coworkers under any 
circumstances.180
An employer might worry that the inability to explain accommo-
dations to coworkers could lead to morale problems.181  As noted ear-
lier, the EEOC has also made clear its view that coworker morale is 
not an adequate basis for a claim of undue hardship, and rightly so; 
the only direct relevance of coworkers’ experience to a finding of un-
due hardship is if accommodating a person with a disability makes 
coworkers unable to perform the essential functions of their jobs (e.g., 
because they are performing so many additional tasks as part of the 
disabled coworker’s accommodation).182  To help employers deal with 
179 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B) (2000). 
180 The EEOC’s Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation and Guidance on Psychiatric 
Disabilities contain similar, though slightly different, discussions of the issue.  In addi-
tion, because the EEOC Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation specifically states merely 
that the employee can disclose, so long as there is no coercion by the employer, a cau-
tious employer could reasonably infer that it may not disclose even if the employee 
gives permission.  See infra notes 182-183, 189. 
181 See, e.g., Lisa E. Key, Co-Worker Morale, Confidentiality, and the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 1003, 1039-40 (1997). 
182 EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION, supra 
note 113 (“An employer cannot claim undue hardship based on employees’ (or cus-
tomers’) fears or prejudices toward the individual’s disability.  Nor can undue hardship 
be based on the fact that provision of a reasonable accommodation might have a nega-
tive impact on the morale of other employees.  Employers, however, may be able to 
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morale-related concerns, though, the EEOC has done an awkward 
dance, suggesting that employers can engage in a kind of generalized 
double-talk about protecting workers’ privacy and complying with 
federal law, which effectively says without saying so directly that the 
employer is accommodating a disability.183
Though perhaps an understandable compromise on a difficult is-
sue, the EEOC’s position is flawed.  It fails to protect employee pri-
vacy, and it also may send the message that disability is a source of 
embarrassment or shame.  Moreover, as I have urged, where accom-
modations have third-party benefits and the disabled employee ap-
proves, it would be far better if employers disclosed the impetus for 
those accommodations in a way that promotes the integrative pur-
poses discussed earlier.  Some work suggests that carefully designed 
disclosure of the disability and the accommodation can have impor-
tant effects not only on work-group morale but also on coworkers’ atti-
tudes toward the accommodated employee.184  Designing disclosure to 
show undue hardship where provision of a reasonable accommodation would be un-
duly disruptive to other employees’[] ability to work.” (footnote omitted)).  Of course, 
one may also read Barnett as articulating a broader notion of undue hardship based on 
coworker morale, where job entitlements are at stake.  See supra text accompanying 
notes 110-111 (discussing US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002)). 
183 For instance, the Guidance on Psychiatric Disabilities says that, while an employer 
may not disclose medical information or the fact that an accommodation has been 
provided (because it implies that there is a disability), the employer may respond to 
coworker questions by explaining “that it is acting for legitimate business reasons or in 
compliance with federal law.”  EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON PSYCHIATRIC DIS-
ABILITIES, supra note 19.  The Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation goes further, saying 
that 
[a]n employer may certainly respond to a question from an employee about 
why a coworker is receiving what is perceived as “different” or “special” treat-
ment by emphasizing its policy of assisting any employee who encounters dif-
ficulties in the workplace.  The employer also may find it helpful to point out 
that many of the workplace issues encountered by employees are personal, 
and that, in these circumstances, it is the employer’s policy to respect em-
ployee privacy.  An employer may be able to make this point effectively by re-
assuring the employee asking the question that his/her privacy would similarly 
be respected if s/he found it necessary to ask the employer for some kind of 
workplace change for personal reasons. 
EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION, supra note 113. 
184 See, e.g., Lauren B. Gates, Workplace Accommodation as a Social Process, 10 J. OCCU-
PATIONAL REHABILITATION 85, 85 (2000) (arguing that a carefully designed disclosure 
plan can help disclosure lose “its status as a taboo topic”); see also Rose A. Daly-Rooney, 
Designing Reasonable Accommodations Through Co-Worker Participation:  Therapeutic Juris-
prudence and the Confidentiality Provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 8 J.L. & 
HEALTH 89 (1993) (suggesting that a “group brainstorming approach” to designing 
reasonable accommodations, which would require disclosure to coworkers, can lead to 
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emphasize any potential benefits to coworkers could help to facilitate 
more positive attitudes. 
For example, Lauren Gates and her colleagues report positive re-
sults from carefully designed disclosure planning—to employers and 
to work groups—for employees with mental health conditions.185  In 
their program, the decision whether to disclose, first to the employer, 
and then, as a separate decision, to coworkers, is left to the employee.  
But if an employee does decide to disclose her condition to the 
broader workplace, then the employer and employee discuss how best 
to reveal the information to other employees.  Gates and her col-
leagues have seen particularly positive results for work groups in 
which disclosure has occurred in a group meeting led by a trained fa-
cilitator (whether a human resources person, a union representative, 
or an Employee Assistance Program counselor), in which the accom-
modation is announced, and then each group member talks about 
how it will likely affect her work.  In such settings, sometimes the em-
ployee with the mental-health condition reveals her disability and the 
accommodation to the work group herself, but sometimes the em-
ployer does the actual disclosing (if, for instance, the employee is not 
comfortable doing so).186  Under the EEOC guidances, however, a 
particularly cautious employer could reasonably decline to disclose 
the employee’s condition, even if the employee actually requested 
that the employer do so. 
The EEOC’s prohibition on disclosure by the employer, although 
not required by the statutory language, is motivated by important pol-
icy considerations.  Particularly for highly stigmatizing impairments, 
such as psychiatric disabilities or HIV, protection of employee privacy 
can be very important.  Research on disclosure of stigmatized identi-
ties suggests that such employees face a complicated calculus, since 
either disclosing or concealing a stigmatized trait can have negative 
consequences.187  In light of these difficulties, an assurance of privacy 
better accommodations, increased focus on the disabled employee’s abilities rather 
than limitations, and improved communication with coworkers). 
185 See Gates, supra note 184, at 91-95; see also Interview with Lauren B. Gates, supra 
note 24 (providing the detailed observations that follow). 
186 For any number of reasons, people with disabilities, physical or mental, may 
sometimes prefer not to have to tell their own stories.  Cf. Elizabeth F. Emens, Shape 
Stops Story, 15 NARRATIVE 124, 130-31 (2007).  This may mean a desire not to have their 
stories told at all, or it may sometimes mean a desire not to have to be the one doing 
the telling. 
187 See, e.g., Manuela Barreto, Naomi Ellemers & Serena Banal, Working Under 
Cover:  Performance-Related Self-Confidence Among Members of Contextually Devalued Groups 
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may be a necessary condition for employees to speak up and request 
accommodations at all.  For these reasons, the employee should have 
the last word on whether her disability is disclosed in her workplace—
much as the employer has the last word as between two effective ac-
commodations.188  However, to say this is merely to set a floor. 
The EEOC should revise its recommendations on this issue not 
only to set a floor ensuring the employee’s right to control disclosure, 
but also to urge employers to rise above it.  In particular, the EEOC 
should do three things to promote disclosure that, where acceptable 
to the employee, could help promote the integrative purposes dis-
cussed:  (1) encourage a dialogue between employer and employee 
about whether the employee wants disclosure of the accommodation 
and, if so, in what manner; (2) make clear that an employee can give 
the employer permission to disclose the accommodation, and not 
merely that the employee can tell her coworkers about it herself 189 
(because, inter alia, claims that an accommodation is benefiting co-
workers may be more plausible coming from the employer); and (3) 
provide guidelines for disclosing accommodations to work groups in a 
constructive manner that particularly emphasizes third-party benefits. 
In addition, because nondisclosure (or the half-disclosure that the 
EEOC favors) of disability and accommodation might actually in-
crease stigma, the EEOC should articulate some of the benefits of 
careful and constructive disclosure.  Gates has found that employees 
Who Try To Pass, 37 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCH. 337, 349 (2006) (reporting on a study of an in-
visible, contextually devalued trait and showing that concealers thought their partners 
had more positive expectations of their ability to perform while the concealers them-
selves had lower performance-related self-confidence); John E. Pachankis, The Psycho-
logical Implications of Concealing a Stigma:  A Cognitive-Affective-Behavioral Model, 133 
PSYCH. BULL. 328, 328-29 (2007) (discussing researchers’ recent development of a 
more nuanced view of concealable stigmatized traits, from a view that bearers of such 
traits escaped the negative consequences of stigma to a view that appreciates the po-
tentially negative consequences of concealing the traits); Belle Rose Ragins, Romila 
Singh & John M. Cornwell, Making the Invisible Visible:  Fear and Disclosure of Sexual Orien-
tation at Work, 92 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 1103, 1114 (2007) (reporting that fear of disclosure 
of gay identity at work, among those who had not disclosed or fully disclosed their sex-
ual orientation, “had an overwhelmingly negative relationship with their career and 
workplace experiences and their psychological well-being” but finding little relation-
ship between range of disclosure and outcome variables). 
188 See EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION, supra 
note 113. 
189 The EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation says merely that 
“[a]s long as there is no coercion by an employer, an employee with a disability may 
voluntarily choose to disclose to coworkers his/her disability and/or the fact that s/he 
is receiving a reasonable accommodation.”  Id. 
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with mental health conditions and other stigmatized disabilities tend 
to be aware of the risks of disclosure, but less aware of the potential 
benefits.190
Disclosure can of course be a complicated business with potential 
for missteps—or worse.  An employer particularly hostile to the ADA 
could disclose in a way that fostered negative attitudes by, for instance, 
emphasizing third-party costs.  Thus, one useful feature of permitting 
the relevant employee to prevent disclosure—in addition to protect-
ing employee privacy—is that the employee may be better positioned 
than anyone else to know, from interaction and discussion, if an em-
ployer’s disclosure would be hostile.  Though employee knowledge 
will not be perfect, allowing the employee to use her sense of the em-
ployer and the situation to decide if disclosure is best seems a context-
sensitive approach better suited to these complexities than a blanket 
rule precluding disclosure.  In addition, employees may be particu-
larly attuned to whether a particular accommodation—through neces-
sity or design—will create more third-party costs than benefits.  In 
such circumstances, an employee might decide that she prefers non-
disclosure. 
Interestingly, this discussion of third-party benefits shows that 
nondisclosure may sometimes benefit employers.  Most of the work on 
disclosure requirements has focused on the disadvantage that nondis-
closure imposes on employers, who may want to disclose that an em-
ployee is disabled and being accommodated in order to avoid morale 
problems caused by coworkers who think someone else is getting spe-
cial treatment.191  If, however, an employer designs an accommodation 
that benefits many employees—such as a broad-based telecommuting 
initiative—the employer may have an incentive not to mention the 
role that disability or legal compliance has played in this change in 
the workplace.  The employer may be better able to reap the benefits 
190 See Interview with Lauren B. Gates, supra note 24.  According to Gates, disclo-
sure can have the following benefits for a person with a mental health condition:  it 
allows her to be protected by the ADA and to request accommodation; it relieves her 
of the burden that can come from hiding this aspect of herself; and since others at 
work can usually tell that there is a problem, disclosure prevents them from making up 
an explanation for the problem (such as substance abuse or incompetence) that is 
probably worse for the person.  Id. 
191 See, e.g., Key, supra note 181, at 1009-11 (discussing how employers often deal with 
complaints from employees regarding the special treatment of a coworker with a disabil-
ity); see also Jessica Zeldin, Note, Disabling Employers:  Problems with the ADA’s Confidentiality 
Requirement in Unionized Workplaces, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 737, 741 n.20 (1995) (asserting that 
favoritism shown to the disabled employee may damage employee morale). 
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of these alterations (and even to internalize the benefits directly by 
lowering wages) if coworkers are unaware of the (disability and regu-
latory) origins of the change.  Thus, in an effort to protect employees 
with disabilities by broadly interpreting the nondisclosure require-
ments, the EEOC may be helping employers at the expense of both 
employees with disabilities and the broader purposes of the ADA. 
Directing attitudinal benefits of such accommodations toward dis-
abled people depends instead on coworkers’ knowledge of the role of 
disability in the change.  For coworker attitudes toward disability or 
the ADA to improve by virtue of third-party benefits, the coworker 
needs to know about the role that disability or the ADA played in the 
change that created those benefits.  Without that knowledge, cowork-
ers would presumably credit the employer for the changes.  Thus, 
rather than discouraging disclosure, the EEOC should encourage 
careful and constructive disclosure of accommodations, with the con-
sent and input of the accommodated employee. 
C.  Reasonableness and Undue Hardship 
Courts have elided the question of what role third-party benefits 
should play in determinations of reasonableness or undue hardship.  
Employers might nonetheless have incentives to take some third-party 
benefits into account when choosing between effective accommoda-
tions (as the statute permits them to do), as noted in Part I, to the ex-
tent that those third-party benefits can be internalized by the em-
ployer through more productive employees or more contented 
customers.192  But not all third-party benefits accrue to employees or 
customers.  In addition to the problem transaction costs might pose to 
192 The fact that employers should be able to adjust wages and prices in response 
to such benefits parallels the point that, to the extent that accommodations cost 
money, the employers would presumably pass these costs on to employees or custom-
ers in the form of lower wages or higher prices.  See Christine Jolls, Accommodation 
Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223, 230-33 (2001) (observing that the costs of accommoda-
tion mandates tend to affect wages generally, rather than just those of the accommo-
dated group); Lawrence H. Summers, Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits, 79 AM. 
ECON. REV. 177, 179-82 (1989) (describing the effect of mandated benefits on wages 
and prices); Cass R. Sunstein, Human Behavior and the Law of Work, 87 VA. L. REV. 205, 
236-40 (2001) (describing how the burden imposed by various employment measures 
can be offset by lower wages).  Thus, while accommodations designed for individuals 
may have positive externalities for third parties, they may simultaneously create costs 
for those or other third parties.  That said, this can be true for any accommodation—
whether or not it creates benefits for third parties—so this does not diminish (and in 
fact may increase) the impetus to consider the potential third-party benefits of differ-
ent accommodations. 
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adjusting wages, some kinds of benefits—such as expressive benefits 
(discussed in Part I) or improved attitudes toward disability or the 
ADA (elaborated in Part III)—are public goods that employers would 
have little reason to create. 
Where, then, might third-party benefits be relevant to the legal 
requirement of accommodation?  Perhaps under the ill-defined analy-
sis of either undue hardship or reasonableness.  As discussed in Part I, 
key decisions have not explained whether third-party benefits are rele-
vant to this analysis and, at times, have seemed to overlook the exis-
tence of third-party benefits altogether.  Because courts have drawn 
the contours of reasonable accommodation using the language of 
costs and benefits, courts should consider third-party benefits before 
rejecting accommodations as unreasonable or an undue hardship.193
This is not the place for a full discussion or critique of the doc-
trine of reasonableness or undue hardship, but as those concepts have 
been articulated by key decisions, third-party benefits should be part 
of the analysis.  If reasonableness means that “at the very least, the cost 
could not be disproportionate to the benefit,” then the fact that an 
accommodation will bring benefits to many employees—disabled, 
nondisabled, or sub-ADA disabled—could render the accommodation 
reasonable even if it would only “bring about a trivial improvement in 
the life of a disabled employee.”194  And if the undue hardship defense 
gives the employer a chance to argue, as to an otherwise reasonable 
accommodation, that “upon more careful consideration the costs are 
excessive in relation either to the benefits of the accommodation or to 
the employer’s financial survival or health,”195 then the defense should 
fail if the employer’s showing did not adequately take account of 
third-party benefits generally (on the first prong) or of second-party 
benefits (those internalized by the employer) that undercut the claim 
that the burden was undue.196  Though the (nonexhaustive) statutory 
factors relevant to undue hardship do not include this numerosity di-
mension, legislative history notes the potential relevance of multiple 
193 I am bracketing in this Article the question of whether the courts’ cost-benefit 
approach to reasonableness and undue hardship is sound as a matter of statutory in-
terpretation or social policy.  What I argue requires no fundamental change in the 
statute or the broad doctrinal contours of its interpretation by courts. 
194 Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542-43 (7th Cir. 1995). 
195 Id. at 543. 
196 Borkowski seems to open the door to this by referring to multiple employees in 
its undue hardship discussion, as discussed in Part II.A, supra, though I have found no 
cases that follow this through. 
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disabled users of an accommodation as a factor weighing against a 
finding of undue hardship.197
For instance, Vande Zande’s rejection of telecommuting as unrea-
sonable has been criticized on empirical grounds—through demon-
strations that supervision and administration of such regimes are not 
only feasible but often cost effective.198  The fact that telecommuting 
could be designed as an improvement to the entire workplace—in 
ways that would make work easier, rather than harder, for coworkers, 
as discussed earlier199—could further support a finding of reasonable-
ness and a rejection of an undue hardship defense.200  Yet Vande Zande 
entirely overlooks this possibility. 
The court’s cost-benefit approach to reasonableness and undue 
hardship might thus require a consideration of third-party benefits.  
As discussed in the next Part, disability advocates may reasonably 
worry that urging courts to consider third-party benefits relevant to 
determinations of reasonableness or undue hardship would lead 
197 In addition, the House Report accompanying the ADA includes the following 
passage: 
The Committee also intends that the factors set forth in 101(9)(B) are not ex-
clusive and that in appropriate circumstances courts and the administrative 
agencies may use other relevant factors . . . . For example, the number of em-
ployees or applicants potentially benefiting from an accommodation may be a 
relevant consideration in determining undue hardship where use by more 
than one person with a disability would reduce the relative financial impact of 
an accommodation.  For example, a ramp installed for a new employee who 
uses a wheelchair not only benefits that employee but will also benefit mobil-
ity-impaired applicants and employees in the future.  Assistive devices for 
hearing and visually-impaired persons may be shared by more than one em-
ployee so long as each employee is not denied a meaningful equal employ-
ment opportunity caused by limited access to the needed accommodation.  
On the other hand, the Committee wishes to make clear that the fact that an 
accommodation is used by only one employee should not be used as a nega-
tive factor counting in favor of finding an undue hardship.  By its very nature, 
an accommodation should respond to a particular individual’s needs in rela-
tion to performance of a specific job at a specific location.  It is not the Com-
mittee’s intent that the individualized nature of the accommodation process 
be undermined when considering whether other employees may be benefited 
by the accommodation requested by a single individual. 
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, at 69 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 351.  Note that 
the House Report makes no mention of possible benefits to nondisabled employees. 
198 See, e.g., Ludgate, supra note 161, at 1322 n.82, 1333-34 (citing research studies 
suggesting that telecommuting may actually increase worker productivity). 
199 See supra Part III.B. 
200 But cf. Kvorjak v. Maine, 259 F.3d 48, 57 (1st Cir. 2001) (claiming that one 
worker’s telecommuting would pose an undue burden on coworkers). 
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courts to begin to consider third-party benefits as necessary to reason-
able accommodations—or as an important factor in determining un-
due hardship—or prompt more attention to third-party costs.201  This 
is a legitimate concern. 
Nonetheless, as noted earlier, the Supreme Court has already in-
dicated in Barnett that third-party costs could lead to a determination 
that an accommodation is unreasonable.202  And the courts’ cost-
benefit analysis of accommodations is far from an exact science.203  To 
the extent that courts are simply eyeballing the costs and benefits, and 
are considering third-party costs relevant to that assessment, they 
should also consider third-party benefits. 
In order to rationalize the current doctrine, courts following 
Vande Zande should therefore take account of potential third-party 
benefits before rejecting accommodations as either unreasonable or 
an undue hardship.  This is most plainly true of the reasonableness 
inquiry, both because the Court has already stated the relevance of 
third-party costs in this domain, and because reasonableness involves a 
more general balancing of benefits and costs, including those that will 
not be internalized by the employer.  The undue hardship analysis 
places greater emphasis on the burden to employers.  Therefore, it 
may be sensible to assume that, given the complexities of assessing 
third-party benefits and costs, employers—not courts—are best situ-
ated to assess the ones that they will internalize.  Or it might seem that 
only usage benefits, but not attitudinal benefits, are relevant to the 
undue hardship analysis.  However, Vande Zande does generally fold 
“the benefits of the accommodation” into the “undue” part of the un-
due hardship inquiry;204 accordingly, though reasonableness seems 
the more obvious place for considering third-party benefits, particu-
larly attitudinal benefits, courts should consider such benefits relevant 
to undue hardship as well. 
Opinions that explicitly took account of third-party benefits could 
increase attitudinal benefits by raising awareness of third-party bene-
fits, and could also create incentives for employees to propose ac-
commodations that have third-party benefits.  But I do not imagine 
that courts will be major instruments of social change in this regard, 
for several reasons.  First, so many cases fail at the stage of determin-
201 See infra Part V. 
202 US Airways, Inc., v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 397, 400-01 (2002); see also Part II.A. 
203 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 80. 
204 See supra text accompanying note 195. 
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ing whether the plaintiff falls within the scope of the statute that the 
accommodation question is often not even reached.205  Second, the 
accommodation requests that make it to court are less likely to be 
ones involving many third-party benefits, particularly once employers 
are made more aware of the possibility of such benefits.  Third, some 
aspects of third-party benefits will be difficult or impossible for courts 
to assess.  Most obviously, experimentation benefits depend on the 
contingent fact of whether the experiment succeeds, as discussed ear-
lier.206  Courts may therefore be unable to take into account all the 
potential third-party benefits, even under the ad hoc form of cost-
benefit analysis of accommodations set forth in Vande Zande.207
Nonetheless, courts should take these benefits into account for a 
simple doctrinal reason:  existing doctrine articulates these tests in 
terms of costs and benefits, so courts should consider the full range of 
such benefits, as well as the costs, when deciding whether accommo-
dations are reasonable or whether they present an undue hardship to 
employers. 
D.  Promotion and Publicity 
Attention to third-party benefits should prompt new approaches 
to public and private administration and publicity surrounding the 
statute.  Public entities charged with facilitating the statute’s imple-
mentation should work to make third-party benefits visible and to 
promote their development. 
For instance, the Job Accommodation Network ( JAN) provides 
advice to employers about how to accommodate employees with dis-
abilities.208  Its current website, which contains a great deal of informa-
tion about particular disabilities and possible accommodations, makes 
no reference to third-party benefits.  With some textual revisions and 
205 See infra note 229 (discussing the narrowing effect of the statutory definition of 
disability).  For example, an employee’s request for better ventilation in a workplace 
involving chemical fumes would look more promising if other workers’ health were 
taken into account.  But the case on this point that came before the Seventh Circuit 
failed because the asthmatic plaintiff was determined not to be substantially limited in 
a major life activity.  See Webb v. Clyde L. Choate Mental Health & Dev. Ctr., 230 F.3d 
991 (7th Cir. 2000). 
206 See supra Part I.D.5.c. 
207 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 80. 
208 The JAN is a free service of the Office of Disability Employment Policy, U.S. 
Department of Labor.  See JAN Homepage, http://www.jan.wvu.edu (last visited Feb. 
15, 2008). 
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additional training, its promotional materials and individual consult-
ing could encourage employers to see how some accommodations 
could have such benefits.209  For reasons I will discuss shortly, one 
might worry that employers could be so attracted to accommodations 
with third-party benefits, especially those that can be internalized, that 
they might become more reluctant to grant necessary accommoda-
tions that do not have such benefits.  But the JAN could make clear 
that an employer is required by law to grant a necessary accommoda-
tion that does not impose an undue hardship, even if the only avail-
able reasonable accommodation has no third-party benefits.  More-
over, following the revisions to the EEOC guidance on disclosure 
suggested in Part IV.B, the JAN could encourage employers to give 
due credit to employees with disabilities for prompting the redesign 
that led to the third-party benefits—thus promoting the integrating 
accommodation idea—subject to the employee’s consent.  This could 
help engender both greater attitudinal and greater usage benefits. 
More generally, other public and private entities could do more to 
emphasize the third-party benefits of disability accommodations.  
Right now—perhaps because of the concerns discussed earlier about 
potentially diminishing the individualized focus of the statute—the 
EEOC and other entities that provide information to employers about 
accommodations do not mention, much less highlight, third-party 
benefits.210  This approach should be reconsidered.  Relevant govern-
ment agencies and public-interest organizations should revise their 
educational literature and promotional materials to emphasize that 
accommodations can create second- and third-party benefits and, 
more importantly, that accommodations can be designed to create 
more benefits and to minimize costs, in ways that help to improve 
workplace morale and productivity and to promote favorable attitudes 
toward disability and the ADA. 
E.  Implications for Diversity Initiatives 
Recognizing that disability accommodations have multiple benefici-
aries could also affect the way institutions think about their diversity ini-
tiatives.  Diversity initiatives—programs or policies to promote diversity 
209 For important research asking employers about the extent to which their ac-
commodations have indirect as well as direct benefits, see the work of Peter Blanck and 
colleagues, supra notes 26, 28. 
210 See supra note 114 (providing examples of EEOC and other websites that do not 
acknowledge the third-party benefits of accommodations). 
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within a particular institution—less often include disability than race and 
sex.211  There could be many reasons for this “disability gap,” including 
the fact that disability was a relative latecomer to the civil rights move-
ments, or a reasoned judgment that the problems of discrimination with 
regard to race and sex are deeper, more invidious, or more pressing.  
Whether or not these explanations are valid, the analysis in this Article 
points to another factor that likely contributes to the disability gap:  the 
perceived costs, and neglected benefits, of accommodation. 
Since courts and agencies charged with administering the ADA 
seem to view it principally in terms of costs to employers and third par-
ties,212 it should not surprise us if businesses and educational institu-
tions consider integrating disabled people a costly prospect.  Leaders of 
such institutions may reason that they will comply with the law and aim 
to evaluate fairly any disabled people who apply, including providing 
accommodations if necessary, but they are not going to take affirmative 
steps to encourage more people with disabilities to enter their doors.  
Such affirmative steps could well seem like a foolish courting of costs. 
Appreciating the third-party benefits of accommodations could al-
ter that calculus.  To see that accommodation is not only costly, but can 
offer broader benefits, could tip the balance for some institutional ac-
tors in favor of including disability in a diversity initiative.  Recognizing 
that requests for accommodation could prompt technological innova-
tions, or salubrious modifications to the physical plant, or experiments 
in managerial approach or flexible working arrangements, could be 
enough to make disability look more appealing.  The third-party bene-
fits need not outweigh the costs; diversity initiatives entertain multiple 
goals, which may be worth some degree of cost.  But to see that disabil-
ity accommodations are, on balance, not as costly as they at first appear, 
because of the potential for broader benefits, creates the potential to 
help close the disability gap for some institutions’ diversity initiatives. 
Moreover, this analysis shows how including disability could help a 
diversity initiative with its broader project of institutional inclusion.  
211 There are few studies of which groups are included in diversity initiatives, but 
what I have found supports what anecdotal observation suggests—the existence of a 
disability gap.  See, e.g., WILLIAM ERICKSON ET AL., WEB-BASED STUDENT PROCESSES 
AT COMMUNITY COLLEGES:  REMOVING BARRIERS TO ACCESS 2 (2007), http:// 
digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1241&context=edicollect 
(reporting that “slightly over half of the schools (57%) [responding to the survey] had 
a student diversity plan and about half (48%) of those with a plan included students 
with disabilities in the plan”). 
212 See supra Part II. 
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The perspective of integrating accommodation provides a conceptual 
and practical framework that productively utilizes the tension inher-
ent in the dilemma of difference.213  This analysis provides tools for 
thinking about interventions in a way that both meets individual needs 
and, where possible through design and implementation, promotes 
broader welfare (usage benefits) and integrative goodwill (attitudinal 
benefits).  Thus, this way of thinking about accommodation begins to 
show how integrating disability can help to concretize the metaphors 
of inclusion—of “structural” change, institutional “architecture,” and 
“barriers” to integration214—and thus to provide conceptual and prac-
tical tools for facilitating diversity. 
There are signs that some institutions are taking affirmative steps 
on behalf of disability diversity.215  A broader recognition of accommo-
dation’s third-party benefits could help to accelerate this movement. 
V.  CONCERNS:  INTEREST CONVERGENCE AND DRIFT 
I’m concerned by the abuse of the disabled toilet[.]  I’m not talking about 
vandalism . . . but the use of our toilets by able bodied people. 
Alan, British wheelchair user
216
 
Calling attention to the third-party benefits of accommodations 
raises two related concerns.  First, considering the benefits to third 
parties may shift the focus of the ADA from its proper place:  the 
rights of individuals with disabilities.  Second, and more specifically, 
discussing third-party benefits before courts may provide a further 
ground for courts to narrow the scope of the ADA.  This Part discusses 
each concern in turn and concludes that while each has merit, neither 
warrants disregard of the third-party benefits of accommodations. 
213 See supra Part III.C. 
214 See, e.g., Susan P. Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion:  Advancing Workplace Equity 
in Higher Education, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 247, 249, 250 (2006). 
215 See generally RILEY, supra note 13. 
216 This quote is provided in Jo-Anne Bichard, Our Toilets:  Access Dilemmas in 
U.K. Public Washrooms, Presentation at the Association of American Geographers 
Annual Meeting (Mar. 9, 2006) (on file with author). 
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A.  Interest Convergence Versus Coalition Building 
Not everyone thinks that the third-party benefits of accommoda-
tion are especially neglected in our society.  Adrienne Asch, in an arti-
cle using lessons of critical race theory to analyze disability, writes, 
How often, for example, are the proliferation of curb cuts, ramped en-
trances, and widened doorways hailed as a benefit for people who push 
shopping carts, or for parents wheeling baby strollers!  I applaud the fact 
that nondisabled persons may discover the convenience of these archi-
tectural changes, but they should not be justified as worthwhile because 
nondisabled people can enjoy them.
217
Asch sees attention to third-party benefits (to nondisabled people, 
rather than to other disabled people) as an instance of Derrick Bell’s 
“interest convergence” principle.  In Bell’s words, “The interest of 
blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it 
converges with the interests of whites.”218
Asch is surely right that we should require no further justification 
for curb cuts and ramps than that they “benefit a portion of the popu-
lation otherwise disenfranchised from our streets and public facili-
ties”; they are “worthwhile even if no substantial benefit accrues to the 
shopper or the parent and child using the stroller.”219  There is some-
thing deeply disheartening about the idea that the majority’s self-
interest alone would determine social policy about disability.  A simi-
lar concern animates debates over the diversity rationale in the con-
text of racial integration.  When diversity is understood to benefit all 
students, this can drift into the view that the purpose of integration is 
to make classrooms more colorful for whites.  Similarly, Asch criticizes 
the celebration of third-party benefits of ramps and curb cuts, and the 
epigraph to this Part expresses outrage at the use of “disabled toilets” 
217 Asch, supra note 156, at 401. 
218 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence Di-
lemma, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY:  THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 
20, 22 (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995).  Bell continues by observing that “the 
Fourteenth Amendment, standing alone, will not authorize a judicial remedy provid-
ing effective racial equality for blacks where the remedy sought threatens the superior 
societal status of middle- and upper-class whites.”  Id.; see also Richard Delgado, Intro-
duction to CRITICAL RACE THEORY:  THE CUTTING EDGE, at xiii, xiv (Richard Delgado 
ed., 1995) (“Because racism is an ingrained feature of our landscape, it looks ordinary 
and natural to persons in the culture. . . . [W]hite elites will tolerate and encourage 
racial advances for blacks only when they also promote white self-interest.”). 
219 Asch, supra note 156, at 401. 
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by nondisabled people (in Britain, where such use is more contested 
than in the United States).220
But even if accommodations should ideally be granted solely be-
cause of their benefits to disabled individuals, that may not in fact be 
sufficient as a political or institutional matter, as Asch acknowledges.221  
Because employment discrimination law in general—and disability ac-
commodations in particular—are increasingly understood by many as 
costly interventions that need to be justified on welfarist grounds, it 
may be politically necessary to identify and make salient the third-
party benefits of accommodations.222  Moreover, for workplace envi-
ronments to change effectively for people with disabilities, it may be 
necessary for the institutional structure and underlying attitudes to 
change.223
Even if the benefit to disabled people is sufficient to get the ac-
commodations put in place, it may nonetheless be constructive to build 
coalitions among people with diverse interests.  Such coalitions may be 
useful both politically and conceptually—to generate political support 
220 See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text (discussing disputes over accessi-
ble-toilet usage in the United States and Britain). 
221 Asch, supra note 156, at 401. 
222 See generally Tristin K. Green, A Structural Approach as Antidiscrimination Mandate: 
Locating Employer Wrong, 60 VAND. L. REV. 849, 851-52 (2007) (describing “a growing 
sense in America that employment discrimination laws have become little more than 
employer-funded subsidies” and arguing that while this may be true for disability ac-
commodation in many cases, the conflation of accommodation and antidiscrimination 
elides the notion of employer wrongdoing that justifies a broader scope for antidis-
crimination efforts). 
223 See supra Part III.  For an example of how attitudes can themselves affect the 
successful implementation of accommodations, consider the following hypothetical, 
like the one that opens this Article, from a disability studies conference: 
At one panel, three filmmakers present visual work related to disability.  As is 
typical at disability studies conferences, the speakers were asked to make their 
presentations in a manner accessible to all audience participants, including 
those who are visually impaired.  One panelist begins her talk by presenting 
her visuals, with no narration or description, until an audience member asks if 
she would provide description.  The panelist seems startled and frustrated.  
From then on, she occasionally provides intrusive and distracting words that 
inadequately convey the visual representations.  By contrast, the other two 
filmmaker-panelists have created films with a thoughtful attention to accessi-
bility.  Their films integrate carefully crafted voice-overs, which elegantly yet 
sparely describe the visual images.  Their films use words, tone, and cadence 
to create an effect that enhances the overall experience for all audience 
members, both those who can, and those who cannot, see the visuals. 
Third-party benefits, or third-party costs, it seems, can thus be created, depending in 
part on the attitude of the person implementing the accommodation.
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for rigorous implementation of existing laws, and to develop new ap-
proaches to thinking about current problems.  As Samuel Bagenstos 
points out in a different context, “bringing together individuals with a 
variety of interests and focusing them on localized efforts to address as-
pects of a particular social problem . . . holds the promise of creating a 
new politics in which people see beyond their initial interests and come 
to understand problems in new ways.”224  More starkly, Richard Ford 
writes, “To make real progress on any of these issues we need people 
from outside the canonical groups of identity politics; we need their 
ideas and we need their cooperation.”225
Promoting broader benefits seems more appealing when under-
stood as coalition building rather than interest convergence.  This 
might merely be a shift in rhetoric.  A more optimistic account would 
suggest that thinking about the role that accommodation plays in the 
workplace more generally not only could help satisfy a broader range 
of preexisting interests, but could also be the best tool for improving 
structural features of that workplace for both people with disabilities 
and a broader range of workers.226
Moreover, it is worth emphasizing that third-party benefits can ac-
crue not only to nondisabled people, but also to other disabled peo-
ple as well as people with impairments that do not rise to the increas-
ingly high ADA threshold.  As courts continue to narrow the defini-
tion of who counts as disabled—by raising the bar on “substantially 
limited,” declining to find certain activities to be “major life activities,” 
or following Sutton’s holding on mitigation to the conclusion that 
plaintiffs who can mitigate must do so—workers who are impaired but 
not ADA-disabled are a growing group in need of attention.227  Attend-
ing to third-party benefits in the design of accommodations can there-
224 Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 
94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 45 (2006). 
225 RICHARD T. FORD, RACIAL CULTURE:  A CRITIQUE 213 (2005). 
226 Cf. GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 159, at 117 (“Those who focus on changing 
particular first-dimension outcomes within the existing hierarchy produce very real 
short-term gains, especially to the immediate beneficiaries.  But they often limit them-
selves to challenging outcomes only as they affect women and people of color.  They 
do not mount a sustained critique of the rules that shape those outcomes for everyone, 
and they fail to imagine a larger—rather than merely reallocated—quantum of benefits.” (em-
phasis added)). 
227 See infra note 229 (providing sources that discuss the effects of the ever-
narrowing definition of “disability”); supra note 121 (discussing the argument that the 
ADA requires mitigation). 
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fore benefit people who fall within a broader idea of ADA beneficiar-
ies than the current Court accepts. 
Finally, the fact is that many accommodations do affect third par-
ties.  They may impose costs, or create benefits, or produce some 
combination of the two.  These effects help to shape attitudes toward 
disability and the ADA.  Therefore, even an approach focused exclu-
sively on the interests of people with disabilities has reason to attend 
to these third-party effects.  And to the extent that costs are generally 
more salient than benefits, such an approach has reason to identify 
and promote benefits. 
B.  Doctrinal Drift 
Another significant concern is that if courts recognize third-party 
benefits as relevant to discussions of accommodation, they may use 
these benefits to narrow the protections of the ADA.  In other words, 
those concerned about disabled people may worry that courts’ recog-
nizing that some accommodations may benefit third parties will trans-
form into a doctrinal requirement that all accommodations must bene-
fit more than one individual employee. 
There is no analytic reason why a drift toward narrowing must oc-
cur.  In theory, courts could take third-party benefits into account in 
making reasonableness and undue hardship determinations without 
saying that such benefits are required.228  But there are nonetheless two 
reasons to be concerned. 
First, the statutory narrowing in other areas of the ADA makes it 
easy to imagine a several-step process through which a lack of third-
party benefits is held against an accommodation.229  In schematic 
form,230 the scenario is this:  In Case #1, the court decides that an ac-
commodation that costs $500 is not unreasonable because, although 
228 Indeed, the legislative history indicates that the fact that an accommodation 
assists only one person should not support a finding of undue hardship.  See supra note 
197; see also Steven B. Epstein, In Search of a Bright Line:  Determining When an Employer’s 
Financial Hardship Becomes “Undue” Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 48 VAND. L. 
REV. 391, 403 (1995) (“[T]he fact that an accommodation benefits only one person 
does not weigh in favor of a finding of undue hardship.”). 
229 For discussions of the ways courts have narrowed the scope of the ADA, see 
Anderson, supra note 1, at 91-109; Bagenstos, supra note 174; and Chai R. Feldblum, 
Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law:  What Happened?  Why?  And 
What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91 (2000). 
230 I call this a “schematic” version because courts are so rarely comparing actual 
dollar estimates on one or both sides of the balance.  See Sunstein, supra note 80. 
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the benefits to the employee with a disability who requested it are 
worth only $50, the third-party benefits to coworkers and customers 
are worth an additional $300.  Thus, even though costs still exceed 
benefits, the cost is not “disproportionate to the benefit.”231  In Case #2, 
a year later, the court is then confronted with an accommodation re-
quest that costs $500, and has benefits to the requesting employee of 
$300.  Is the cost disproportionate to the benefit?  There is no formula 
in the statute or doctrine.  But with Case #1 on the books, the court 
might be more inclined to say that this accommodation is unreason-
able because it has fewer overall benefits ($50 less)—and no benefits 
to third parties—in contrast to the accommodation in Case #1.  Had 
the court in Case #1 not based its decision partly on third-party bene-
fits, Case #2 might be more likely to result in a finding of reasonable-
ness.  This is very speculative, but far from impossible in light of the 
reception of the ADA in the courts over the last seventeen years. 
Second, courts that account for third-party benefits might also fo-
cus more on third-party costs.  As noted earlier, some decisions al-
ready discuss third-party costs, and the EEOC has concluded that 
while morale costs are not sufficient reason to refuse an accommoda-
tion, an accommodation that interfered sufficiently with others’ pro-
ductivity could create an undue hardship.  And the Supreme Court 
has concluded that the third-party costs of unsettling a seniority sys-
tem are enough to create a presumption of unreasonableness.232  If 
third-party benefits entered the doctrinal analysis, one would expect 
defense-side litigators, as well as courts, to pay even more attention to 
these third-party costs.  Moreover, if there is any validity to the point 
that costs are more salient than benefits under the statute,233 then we 
might expect the third-party costs to outshine the third-party benefits, 
no matter the underlying reality, in the eyes of courts. 
All that said, under the statute and key decisions, benefits need 
not outweigh costs for an accommodation to be reasonable and not 
an undue hardship.234  And the statute’s individualized focus should 
help to bolster it against undue narrowing through the mechanism of 
231 Vande Zande v. State of Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542-43 (7th Cir. 
1995). 
232 See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 404-05 (2002); EEOC, ENFORCE-
MENT GUIDANCE ON REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION, supra note 113; see also text ac-
companying supra notes 110-111 (discussing Barnett). 
233 See supra Part II. 
234 See supra Part II.A. 
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third-party benefits.235  Moreover, the legislative history asserts that an 
accommodation cannot be an undue hardship just because it cannot 
be used by multiple disabled employees.236  To be sure, the risk of doc-
trinal drift cannot be ruled out in the abstract.  But ultimately, regard-
less of the outcomes, third-party benefits should be considered under 
the current doctrine on reasonableness and undue hardship because 
that doctrine requires a comparison of costs and benefits, with third-
party costs already considered part of the mix. 
CONCLUSION 
Integration under the ADA means more than integrating people 
with disabilities; it also means integrating accommodations.  By the 
statute’s mandate, workplaces must confront physical or procedural 
changes called “accommodations.”  Such changes are important first 
and foremost because they enable the work and participation of dis-
abled people.  Accommodations thus facilitate “contact” between dis-
abled people and nondisabled people in the workplace.  However, 
these changes are also important because the accommodations them-
selves interact with third parties—disabled, nondisabled, and sub-ADA 
disabled. 
Courts and other entities administering the ADA have recognized 
that accommodations may create third-party costs, but they have over-
looked the potential for third-party benefits.  Third-party benefits can 
lead to a form of contact between accommodations and coworkers 
that improves attitudes toward disability and the ADA.  In this way, 
third-party benefits can facilitate a kind of integration by indirection. 
Because these third-party benefits have largely been overlooked, 
they have not been adequately theorized or analyzed.  This Article pro-
vides conceptual and practical tools for identifying potential third-party 
benefits and for analyzing accommodations in terms of their third-party 
effects.  The spectra sketched in Parts I and III supply a way of thinking 
about how accommodation design can determine whether accommo-
dations have third-party costs or benefits or both.  The analysis in Part 
III shows how third-party benefits can further the integrative aims of 
the ADA, and demonstrates how the two distinct models of accommo-
dation—static and dynamic—work together to make the ADA a potent 
force for institutional change.  Finally, maintaining the focus on pro-
235 See supra note 173 and accompanying text. 
236 See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
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moting integration of people with disabilities requires the disaggrega-
tion of two types of third-party benefits:  general welfare improve-
ments (usage benefits) and disability-related attitude improvements 
(attitudinal benefits).  Part IV provides a framework for analyzing ac-
commodations in terms of their design and disclosure, to promote at-
titudinal benefits and, secondarily, usage benefits.  The hope is that 
these tools can be of conceptual and practical use to scholars, policy-
makers, and employers. 
Disability is often understood as principally entailing lack or loss, 
and the ADA as requiring redistributive largesse by employers and co-
workers.  Nothing in this Article’s analysis—or in the text or doctrinal 
interpretation of the ADA—requires the repudiation of these views.  
Benefits need not exceed costs under the statute.  But disability and 
accommodation provide a unique lens through which to challenge 
and improve our workplaces and beyond.  The fact of third-party 
benefits should help us to see the ways that disability—and accommo-
dation—give something back to our integrative projects across catego-
ries and to society in general. 
 
